Negative Activism by Bliss, Barbara A. et al.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 97 Issue 5 
2020 
Negative Activism 
Barbara A. Bliss 
University of San Diego School of Business Administration 
Peter Molk 
University of Florida Levin College of Law 
Frank Partnoy 
UC Berkeley School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the 
Corporate Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk, and Frank Partnoy, Negative Activism, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1333 (2020). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol97/iss5/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 















VOLUME 97 NUMBER 5 2020  
 
NEGATIVE ACTIVISM 
BARBARA A. BLISS, PETER MOLK & FRANK PARTNOY* 
ABSTRACT 
Shareholder activism has become one of the most important and widely 
studied topics in law and finance. To date, popular and academic accounts 
have focused on what we call “positive activism,” where activists seek to 
profit from positive changes in the share prices of targeted firms. In this 
Article, we undertake the first comprehensive study of positive activism’s 
mirror image, which we term “negative activism.” Whereas positive 
activists focus on increasing share prices, negative activists take short 
positions to profit from decreasing share prices. 
We develop a descriptive typology of three categories of negative 
activism and use a private database of activist activity and other hand-
collected information to provide empirical evidence about the frequency 
and manner with which each category occurs. First, informational negative 
activism seeks to uncover and then communicate the truth about companies 
whose shares the activists believe are overvalued. We show that the 
announcement of this kind of activism is associated with a statistically 
significant abnormal decline in share prices. Second, operational negative 
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Levin College of Law. Frank Partnoy is the Adrian A. Kragen Professor of Law at UC Berkeley School 
of Law. Thanks to Ken Ayotte, Andrew Baker, Robert Bartlett, Vince Buccola, Jordan Bulka, Peter 
Conti-Brown, Jessica Erickson, Jeffrey Gordon, Joshua Mitts, David Rosenfeld, Roy Shapira, Christina 
Skinner, Steven Solomon, David Webber, and David Zaring, and to participants at the 2019 American 
Law and Economics Association conference, the Corporate and Securities Litigation Workshop, and a 
workshop at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania for helpful discussions and 
suggestions. 











activism involves dismantling or disabling sources of value at companies. 
We document a range of actual and potential instances of operational 
negative activism and associated abnormal share price declines. Third, 
unintentionally negative activists are failed positive activists: their 
announcements of ownership stakes in companies they target are met with 
immediate negative abnormal returns. 
Using this typology and the related evidence, we explore the policy and 
regulatory implications for each category of negative activism. We show a 
range of areas where policy and regulatory goals either conflict with or 
seemingly ignore the effects from negative activism. We also offer several 
ways that existing regulatory approaches could be improved to account for 
negative activism. In general, we advocate less regulation, and even 
subsidization, of informational negative activism; tighter regulation of 
operational negative activism; and a more nuanced approach to 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of December 17, 2019, Muddy Waters, an investment 
fund, released a statement that it had bet against shares of NMC Health, a 
United Arab Emirates-based healthcare company, based on “serious doubts 
about the company’s financial statements, including its asset values, cash 
balance, reported profits, and reported debt levels.”1 NMC Health’s share 
price fell by more than one-fourth that morning.2 
On June 17, 2018, Elon Musk announced that a Tesla employee had 
sabotaged the car company’s operations, changing its computer code, and 
exporting sensitive data to third parties. Musk wrote: “We need to figure out 
if he was acting alone or with others at Tesla and if he was working with 
any outside organizations.”3 
On April 11, 2017, three roadside bombs exploded while the German 
soccer team Borussia Dortmund drove by on its way to a tournament 
 
1. Yusuf Khan, NMC Health Tumbles up to 27% After Carson Block’s Muddy Waters Says It’s 
Short, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2019, 7:15 AM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/nmc-h 
ealth-crashes-27-after-carson-block-muddy-waters-says-its-short-2019-12-1028768403 [https://perma. 
cc/79QQ-Q9DS]. 
2. See id. 
3. CNBC obtained a copy of Musk’s email. See Lora Kolodny, Elon Musk Emails Employees 
About ‘Extensive and Damaging Sabotage’ by Employee, CNBC (June 18, 2018, 5:56 PM), https://www. 
cnbc.com/2018/06/18/elon-musk-email-employee-conducted-extensive-and-damaging-sabotage.html 
[https://perma.cc/K8B4-U8ZA]. 











quarterfinal match. The bombs sent metal pins through the bus, injuring one 
of the players, but miraculously sparing the others. Unlike most sports teams, 
Borussia Dortmund had publicly traded shares.4  
On July 15, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a 
settlement in which Herbalife, the nutritional supplement company, agreed 
to pay $200 million in consumer relief, hire an external monitor, and 
substantially change some of its business practices. 5  FTC officials 
previously had been pressured by various parties, including members of 
Congress, to find that Herbalife misled investors by failing to disclose that 
most of its sales were generated from recruiting new distributors, not from 
selling to customers.6 
On February 10, 2015, an inter partes review was filed with the U.S. 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, challenging a patent held by Acorda 
Therapeutics, Inc., a pharmaceutical company whose shares were traded on 
NASDAQ.7 The media reported the news of the filing the same day.8 
On May 15, 2014, Jim Chanos, the head of Kynikos Associates, appeared 
on CNBC and criticized Keurig Green Mountain and SodaStream, two 
manufacturers of single-serve beverages. Chanos expressed skepticism 
about efforts by both companies to expand into single-serve cold products.9 
 
4. For a long-form writeup of this story, see Thomas Rogers, The Get-Rich-Quick Scheme that 
Almost Killed a German Soccer Team, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 28, 2018, 11:01 PM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-29/the-get-rich-quick-scheme-that-almost-killed-a-germ 
an-soccer-team [https://perma.cc/4P77-E6TL]. 
5. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission: FTC v. Herbalife International of America, Inc., 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2016/07/statement-federal 
-trade-commission-ftc-v-herbalife-international-america [https://perma.cc/2QVK-CLK8]. 
6. See Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, Herbalife Settlement with F.T.C. Ends 
Billionaires’ Battle, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/dealbo 
ok/herbalife-ftc-inquiry-settlement-william-ackman.html [https://perma.cc/2WZH-RW5P]. 
7. See Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 8,663,685 at 1, Coal. for Affordable 
Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No. IPR2015-00720 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2015). 
8. See, e.g., Julia La Roche, Kyle Bass’ War Against the US Pharmaceutical Industry Has 
Officially Begun, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2015, 1:48 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/kyle-bass-
files-first-ipr-petition-2015-2 [https://perma.cc/Q9HY-9R8L]. For a study of this strategy, see J. 
Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog, Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process 
Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns?, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 120, 130 & n.43 (2015).  
9. See Bruno J. Navarro, Jim Chanos: Best Shorts in a Bull Market, CNBC: HALFTIME REP. 













Year after year, shareholder activism dominates both media headlines10 
and legal scholarship.11 Hundreds of times per year, a hedge fund activist 
announces that it has acquired a significant stake in a company and then 
demands reform.12 The targeted company’s stock price typically increases 
during the time surrounding the announcement, and often a vicious battle 
ensues.13 Shareholder activists say they are trying to improve companies 
 
10. The year 2017 alone had activist campaigns involving many familiar firms, including Xerox, 
Procter & Gamble, Nestlé, Whole Foods, and General Motors. See LAZARD, 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR IN 
REVIEW (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/450414/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-q4-20 
17pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS2G-QSRL]. This trend continued in 2018. See LAZARD, REVIEW OF 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM – 1Q 2018 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/450557/lazard-1q-2018-act 
ivism-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHF3-PLHR] (highlighting campaigns at Lowe’s and Barclays 
Bank, among others). The topic of shareholder activism has even penetrated popular culture, with recent 
Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton characterizing its practitioners as “hit-and-run activists whose 
goal is to force an immediate payout.” Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hillary Clinton Aim Is to Thwart Quick 
Buck on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/business/dealbo 
ok/clinton-aim-is-to-thwart-quick-buck-on-wall-st.html [https://perma.cc/M9JT-TH99]. 
11. Shareholder activism is a particularly fertile area for recent important and influential legal 
scholarship, and arguably has been the most important issue in business law scholarship during the 
previous decade. For examples, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Dancing with Activists, 135 J. FIN. ECON. 
(forthcoming 2020); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge 
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1100 (2015) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term 
Effects]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of 
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 653–59 (2010); K.J. Martijn 
Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016) 
(examining whether staggered boards provide value in the face of increased activism and other 
shareholder interventions); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 
(2013); Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote 
Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 823–46 (2006); 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund 
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870 (2017); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Investor Activism: Reshaping the Playing Field? (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 08-12, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130969 
[https://perma.cc/S5S5-56K9].  
12. See ACTIVIST INSIGHT & SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, THE ACTIVIST INVESTING ANNUAL 
REVIEW 2018, at 6 (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/155375/The-Activist-Inv 
esting-Annual-Review-2018-HiRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL9K-H3GF] [hereinafter ACTIVIST 
INVESTING] (finding the number of activist campaigns grew from 570 in 2013 to 805 in 2017); see also 
Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term Effects, supra note 11, at 1100 (finding hedge fund activism to have 
grown from 10 cases in 1994 to 272 in 2007). 
13. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund 
Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 297 (2016) (finding 
abnormal stock price increases of over 7% during the period immediately surrounding an activist 
intervention public announcement). For a prominent example of the conflicts generated by activist 
interventions, see Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders Strongly Reject Dissident Slate, Ending 
Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/business/29tar 
get.html [https://perma.cc/8237-6DZZ]; see generally Strine, supra note 11, at 1934–56 (discussing 
potential negative effects of investor activism on retail investors that may justify defensive measures). 
 











and increase share prices by persuading management to improve operations, 
or sell off underperforming units, or reveal new information to the public. 
We refer to this well-known kind of shareholder activism as positive 
activism, because its goal is to make money through interventions that 
positively affect share prices.  
Although positive activism has received extensive attention, it is not the 
only form of activism. The six examples cited above also involve activists 
who are attempting to influence companies. However, in these examples, 
the activists are trying to destroy their targets, often in unorthodox or 
undesirable ways. We label activism that seeks to make money through 
interventions that a decrease company’s stock price as negative activism.  
In this Article, we identify and systematically address, for the first time 
in the literature, the concept of negative activism, which is in many ways 
the mirror image of positive activism. In negative activism, the activist 
typically sells short 14  a company’s shares instead of buying them. A 
negative activist thereby seeks to profit from, and has incentives to cause, a 
decline in share prices—the opposite of a positive activist, who profits when 
share prices rise.15 
The above six examples illustrate what we mean by negative activism. 
Muddy Waters, the firm that disclosed skepticism about NMC Health, is run 
by Carson Block, a leading short seller.16 Elon Musk asserted that the Tesla 
employee-saboteur might have been involved with short sellers. 17  The 
perpetrator of the soccer team bombing was a German citizen who had 
 
Although scholarship on activism typically focuses on activists’ efforts to impact share prices, activists 
also on occasion intervene in debt markets. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund 
Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (2009) (studying this 
phenomenon). 
14. In a classic short sale, the seller borrows shares of stock that she does not yet own and sells 
those shares at current market prices; the short seller later “covers” this short position by purchasing the 
share at a future date and then returns the borrowed shares. The short seller therefore profits when share 
prices decrease between her sale and subsequent purchase. Short Sales, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
(Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm [https://perma.cc/M7UL-ZV77]. 
15. Our concept of negative activists therefore encompasses a larger group than activists who 
profit from short positions. In addition to, or instead of, shorting, activists might hold derivative 
instruments that function like shorted shares, which we consider later in the Article. Activists might also 
hold certain debt instruments that increase in value when share prices decline, such as when those debt 
instruments are drafted so that share price declines trigger default in those debt instruments. See, e.g., 
Shaun J. Mathew & Daniel E. Wolf, Shareholder Activism: Evolving Tactics, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Aug. 23, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/23/shareholder-activism-evol 
ving-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/RU7X-QXAX] (describing bondholders acquiring shareholder voting 
rights to trigger company insolvency). But see Vincent S.J. Buccola et al., The Myth of Creditor Sabotage, 
87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that this problem is overstated). For convenience, we 
focus in the Article on activists who profit from shorting company positions, as that method currently 
appears to be the most common form of negative activism. However, our implications apply to the 
broader set of negative activists who hold instruments that pay off upon share price declines. 
16. Khan, supra note 1. 












borrowed money to bet $45,000 against the soccer team’s shares on the day 
of the attack, seeking potential profits of up to $600,000.18 The campaign 
against Herbalife was orchestrated by Pershing Square Capital Management, 
a hedge fund with a $1 billion short position in the company.19 The Acorda 
Therapeutics inter partes patent challenge was filed by the Coalition for 
Affordable Drugs, a group of hedge funds managed by Kyle Bass, who had 
taken a short position in the company.20 Jim Chanos had sold short shares 
of Keurig Green Mountain and SodaStream before he disclosed those 
positions.21 
As we show, negative activism is important and surprisingly common, 
with hundreds of examples in recent years. Some instances involve large 
public companies, such as Herbalife, that are embroiled in controversy.22 
Other examples involve claims of corporate mismanagement or misleading 
disclosures, 23  in many ways providing a quasi-regulatory function 
traditionally served by shareholder class actions, the SEC, and other 
bodies.24 Some negative activism is by firms that hold long positions in 
some companies, but short positions in others. Yet the literature on 
shareholder activism currently focuses on positive activism and ignores 
negative activism, even though negative activism is a significant portion of 
activist activity.25 
Moreover, negative activism presents crucial policy challenges. As the 
word “activism” implies, negative activists do not sit back and wait 
passively for stock prices to decline so that their short positions will gain 
value. Instead, many actively attempt to induce a decrease in share prices. 
In a market economy that typically prioritizes value creation, rather than 
 
18. Although the team’s stock price instantly fell by 2% after the bombing was announced, it 
quickly recovered. The perpetrator later testified that he had set the bombs to traumatize the players, 
disrupt their performance, and tank the stock. See Rogers, supra note 4.  
19. For discussion of Pershing Square’s protracted short position in Herbalife, see Lucinda Shen, 
Ackman Calls It Quits on Herbalife as Pershing Square Restructures, FORTUNE (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:35 
PM), http://fortune.com/2018/02/28/bill-ackman-valeant-herbalife-short/ [https://perma.cc/JD8U-T2X 
X].  
20. Although Acorda Therapeutics’s stock price fell approximately 10% on the day of the 
announcement, subsequent similar patent challenges by the same group were not as profitable. See Sidak 
& Skog, supra note 8, at 123 n.8.  
21. See Navarro, supra note 9.  
22. Valeant Pharmaceuticals is another prominent example. See Lucinda Shen, Bill Ackman 
Finally Apologizes for His ‘Huge Mistake’ with Valeant, FORTUNE (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:15 PM), http://fort 
une.com/2017/03/29/valeant-pharmaceuticals-stock-bill-ackman-pershing-square-hedge-fund-letter/ [h 
ttps://perma.cc/KDT6-UTN2]. 
23. See infra Part II.B.1. 
24. See, e.g., Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2011) (exploring the interaction between various private and public actors in 
enforcing securities fraud prohibitions). 
25. See infra Part I for discussion of the literature on positive activism. 











value destruction, negative activism may strike many as troubling or 
manipulative. 
In this Article, we have two primary goals. First, we set forth an analytic 
framework for assessing different types of negative activism. Like positive 
activism, negative activism exhibits a range of characteristics, and it is 
important not to paint all of negative activism with a single broad brush. A 
saboteur at Tesla or a roadside bomber are different from an anti-corporate 
campaigner or a patent challenger or a skeptic about a company’s 
profitability. We present a rubric for distinguishing among these, and other, 
examples. 
Second, and relatedly, we address potential policy responses to negative 
activism. We argue that responses should be tailored to the characteristics 
of the different types of negative activism. The introductory six examples 
of negative activism do not all deserve the same regulatory response. We 
show several ways that our analysis of negative activism can be applied to 
improve business and financial regulation. In the process, we show how 
scholars and policymakers might adopt and apply our framework to 
business and financial regulation of various types. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on 
positive activism. We describe the conditions that have led to activist 
investing’s rapid rise from a small slice of all investments to a significant 
force today.26 We also summarize the law and finance literature on activist 
investing, and demonstrate its focus on positive activism. 
In Part II, we develop an analytic framework for studying and assessing 
negative activism. We split negative activism into three categories. First, 
informational negative activism seeks to uncover and then communicate the 
truth about companies whose shares the activists believe are overvalued. 
Jim Chanos’s short selling of beverage companies fits this category, as does 
the campaign against General Electric (GE) and certain aspects of the 
campaign against Herbalife. We collect data regarding instances of 
informational negative activism from 2009 through 2016 and show that the 
public announcement of this kind of activism is associated with a 
statistically significant decline in prices surrounding the announcement date. 
In other words, negative activism appears to accomplish the activist’s 
objectives, at least in the short term. 
Second, and in contrast, operational negative activism involves 
dismantling or disabling fundamental sources of value at companies. 
Operational negative activists do more than simply communicate 
information. They actually undertake to change, and even damage, the 
 
26. See, e.g., ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 12 (discussing several new, larger activist 












companies they target. The Dortmund soccer team bombing falls into this 
category, as would the Tesla saboteur if there were proof of a connection to 
short selling. Patent challengers and “hacktivists,” who disrupt company 
information technology systems, present more difficult cases, which we 
discuss in detail. Our discussion of operational negative activism documents 
a range of actual and potential instances of operational negative activism. 
Third, and most unusual, unintentional negative activism involves failed 
attempts at positive activism. Positive activists take long ownership 
positions in companies they target, not short positions, and they seek to 
increase share prices, not decrease them. On average, these positions are 
associated with a 7% cumulative abnormal positive return surrounding 
announcement.27 However, not all positive activist interventions are greeted 
with such enthusiasm. In some cases, the market reaction to the 
announcement of positive activist interventions is negative, sometimes due 
to apparent deep skepticism about the activist’s potential interventions. We 
view these instances where the positive activist unintentionally brings about 
a negative response as unintentional negative activism. Unintentional 
negative activism is a fascinating, yet not previously studied, phenomenon. 
We also briefly discuss unintentional positive activism, which is failed 
attempts at negative activism: in other words, unintentional positive 
activism involves negative activists, who are seeking stock price declines, 
whereas unintentional negative activism involves positive activists, who are 
seeking stock price increases. 
Part III turns to regulation and policy. We summarize the policy goals of 
activist regulation and the current regulatory approach, which largely 
focuses on positive activism. We consider the gaps that this focus has 
generated for regulating negative activism, and we propose ways that 
regulatory policy could and should be improved to account for the 
increasingly prevalent phenomenon of negative activism. 
 Our proposals vary depending on the category of negative activism. We 
view informational negative activism, in light of existing antifraud laws, as 
presenting minimal additional policy concerns; in fact, a case can be made 
for subsidizing this form of negative activism. We see operational negative 
activism very differently: it is often, but not always, deleterious or 
potentially dangerous. We suggest a new regulatory framework aimed 
directly at operational negative activism, and we explore the line-drawing 
questions of informational versus operational negative activism that such a 
system would require. How we think about operational activism depends 
both on its objectives and the extent to which it generates informational 
benefits. Finally, we suggest that policymakers, including courts, view 
 
27. Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13, at 297. 











unintentional negative activism more skeptically than they view general 
positive activism. Although in many ways the market reaction will provide 
all the deterrent that is needed for unintentional negative activism, a 
negative market reaction is an important piece of information that could 
justify a defensive approach by company management. For example, courts 
might take into account a negative market reaction when reviewing anti-
takeover responses by a targeted company. 
We then conclude. 
I. POSITIVE ACTIVISM 
We begin by briefly describing the practice of positive shareholder 
activism as well as the academic research it has generated. This Part sets up 
our focus on negative activism, which we turn to in Part II. 
Positive activism has been driven by hedge funds, which rely on 
exemptions from the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act to 
operate as essentially private, pooled investment vehicles for sophisticated 
investors.28 As hedge funds have become more powerful and influential—
managing some $3 trillion in assets today—so too has their proclivity for 
activism.29 Although there are thousands of hedge funds, with a wide range 
of investment approaches, a significant subset of hedge funds has developed 
strategies that target underperforming companies and then seek a variety of 
operational or financial reforms aimed at increasing shareholder value. 
Positive activists often seek to change company management,30 encourage 
or discourage a potential merger or acquisition, 31  change executive 
 
28. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial 
Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY 
CHALLENGES 101, 114–15 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (noting that although 
“[t]here is no generally agreed-upon definition” for hedge funds, they are typically characterized by four 
factors: investment pooling; professional investment manager administration of those pools; not being 
generally available to the retail public; and operating mostly outside securities regulation and registration 
requirements); Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement Perspective, 39 RUTGERS 
L.J. 541, 544 (2008) (noting that a hedge fund is “generally . . . an entity that holds a pool of securities 
and perhaps other assets that does not register its securities offerings . . . and which is not registered as 
an investment company” (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF 
HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, at 
viii (2003))). 
29. Melissa Karsh, Hedge Fund Assets Pass $3 Trillion in 2016 for First Time: Chart, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-23/hedge-f 
und-assets-pass-3-trillion-in-2016-for-first-time-chart [https://perma.cc/S5BK-YC6H]; see also 
Registration Under the Advisors Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 
10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279) (reporting that hedge funds accounted for 10% to 
20% of all U.S. equity trading by volume). 
30. See, e.g., ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 12, at 17 (recounting efforts by Trian Partners to 
appoint directors at General Electric and Procter & Gamble). 












compensation practices, 32  reform corporate governance, 33  and reveal 
private company-specific information to the public. 34  Each of these 
strategies is designed to add value for shareholders and increase share prices. 
Law and finance scholars responded eagerly to the emergence of positive 
activism. Early studies of hedge funds highlighted the funds’ ability to earn 
significant positive returns, even when adjusted for hedge funds’ 
comparatively high levels of investing risk.35 These early studies, however, 
did not focus on positive activism as a strategy unto itself. Then, in 2007, 
two law professors published a book chapter describing a hand-collected 
dataset of positive activist interventions,36 and during the following years 
several more comprehensive studies were published, consistently showing 
that announcements of positive activism were associated with statistically 
significant increases in targeted firms’ share prices.37 Scholars also began 
examining the characteristics of positive activism, including its varied 
objectives and strategies.38  
For more than a decade, legal scholars and practitioners also have 
debated a range of policy issues related to positive activism.39 Proponents 
of positive activism argue that it helps reduce the shareholder apathy and 
agency cost problems that inflict publicly held firms, pointing to the positive 
 
32. Id. at 46–47 (summarizing efforts by asset managers to influence executive compensation 
practices). 
33. Id. at 8 (noting that 38% of public activist demands of large firms were related to corporate 
governance issues). 
34. See, e.g., Shen, supra note 19 (discussing efforts to affect Herbalife’s share price). 
35. See, e.g., Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and 
Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833 (1999); Bing Liang, On the Performance of Hedge Funds, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
July–Aug. 1999, at 72; see generally René M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Spring 2007, at 175 (summarizing hedge fund performance literature). 
36. See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 28.  
37. See, e.g., Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study, 30 
REV. FIN. STUD. 2933 (2017); William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1375, 1418–21 (2007); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) [hereinafter Brav, Jiang, Partnoy 
& Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism]; Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The 
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 45 [hereinafter Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy & Thomas, Returns]; Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund 
Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681 (2007); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or 
Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323 (2008); April Klein & 
Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. 
FIN. 187 (2009). 
38. See Matthew R. Denes et al., Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical 
Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405 (2017); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007); Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and 
Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459 (2013). 
39. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, US Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
SHAREHOLDER POWER 99, 104 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (describing the 
shareholder activism literature); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact 
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016) (raising concerns about 
positive activism); Strine, supra note 11 (same). 











shareholder returns associated with positive activism. 40  Critics question 
whether positive activism generates long-term value or instead sacrifices 
these gains for fleeting short-term profits.41 Several leading scholars have 
written comprehensive assessments and critiques of various aspects of 
positive activism.42 
In sum, positive activism has become a central topic in corporate and 
securities law, perhaps the central topic. Given the predominance of debate 
about positive activism, it is striking how little attention has been paid to its 
mirror counterpart, negative activism, which we turn to now. 
II. NEGATIVE ACTIVISM  
Our treatment of negative activism contrasts sharply with scholarship on 
positive activism, for the straightforward reason mentioned above: Negative 
activism profits when share prices decline. In contrast, positive activism 
involves activists’ efforts to increase the value of target company shares. 
Although commentators have disagreed about the impact of positive 
shareholder activists, the widespread assumption has been that positive 
activists are at least attempting to add value to share prices, hence the 
adjective “positive.”43 
Instead, the analysis of negative activism necessarily begins with the 
proposition that successful negative activism is bad for shareholders of the 
targeted firm. Thus, unlike positive activism, which often carries a powerful 
and positive normative presumption from increasing stock prices, negative 
activism faces an uphill normative battle, the presumption being that it 
destroys shareholder value. 
As we show in this Part, negative activism is an even more complex and 
varied phenomenon than positive activism. The motivations and techniques 
of negative activists vary widely. Accordingly, we begin by presenting a 
taxonomy of three categories of negative activism, based on whether it is 
primarily informational, operational, or unintentional. Then we demonstrate 
 
40. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 11. 
41. Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 26, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/0 
2/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-companywreck-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/7YF 
N-MTJZ]. 
42. See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 39; Strine, supra note 11; John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 373/2017, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3058319 [http 
s://perma.cc/BA99-ZJLX]; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: 
Evidence and Implications (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 489, 2014) [hereinafter Coffee 
& Palia, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2496518 [https://perma.cc/7D 
WY-BRH9]. 












some of the characteristics associated with each of these three categories of 
negative activism by considering a range of data, both statistical and 
anecdotal. Much of this analysis focuses on the behavior of hedge funds, 
which are the primary players in this space. In other work, we develop the 
case for how other types of institutional players beyond hedge funds could 
engage in negative activism as part of a broader strategy of short selling.44 
A. Three Categories of Negative Activism 
To capture negative activism’s nuances, we split it into three categories. 
First, we characterize as informational negative activism behavior that seeks 
to uncover and then communicate the truth about companies whose shares 
the activists believe are overvalued. Examples include recent short sellers 
at Herbalife, Valeant, and numerous financial institutions, who have 
undertaken investigations that they believed established the companies’ 
public share prices overstated their actual value. Enron is another prominent 
example, where negative activists uncovered and disclosed information 
about accounting fraud in 2001.45 Informational negative activism can be 
backwards-looking, focused on past disclosures by companies and typically 
involving allegations of misstatements or omissions, or forward-looking, 
focused on future expectations about a company’s prospects.46 
Second, operational negative activism seeks to change the operations of 
a company, by dismantling or disabling sources of earnings or cash flow. 
For example, operational negative activists have taken short positions in a 
company and then argued that its patents were invalid, attempting to reduce 
that company’s value. Other operational negative activists have attempted 
to influence the likelihood of mergers or recapitalizations, again in an 
attempt to reduce share prices. Unlike informational negative activism, 
operational negative activism typically is focused on the future, rather than 
the past, except to the extent past facts are helpful in assisting the activist 
campaign to harm the company’s future prospects. 
Third, unintentional negative activism involves attempts at positive 
activism that instead are associated with a reduction in share value. Studies 
of positive shareholder activism have provided overwhelming evidence that 
stock prices usually react positively during the period surrounding the 
 
44. Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Institutional Investors as Short Sellers?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 837 
(2019). 
45. Cassell Bryan-Low & Suzanne McGee, Enron Short Seller Detected Red Flags in Regulatory 
Filings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2001, 1:08 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100491600697855064 
0 [https://perma.cc/YBV3-V33U].  
46. See, e.g., Carson Block, Founder, Muddy Waters Capital, Presentation at the Absolute Return 
Symposium: “Activist” Short Selling 16 (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.hvst.com/attachments/4120 [http 
s://perma.cc/4PBZ-XDSL]. 











public announcement of activist intervention.47  However, recent studies 
have demonstrated significant variance in the individual stock price 
reactions.48 Although the mean announcement returns are positive, some 
attempted positive shareholder activism is associated with a negative market 
reaction. It is this subset of attempted positive interventions that we label 
unintentional negative activism. 
Although negative activism has negative connotations and can result in 
harm to firms and society, certain forms of negative activism also can 
generate substantial benefits. Informational negative activism can be 
desirable when it generates and discloses valuable information, thereby 
enhancing the informational efficiency of markets and helping to move 
stock prices closer to their fundamental value. Even operational negative 
activism can be desirable, if it eliminates company value that never should 
have been present, such as by unwinding patents that turn out to have been 
improvidently granted.  
 When addressing shareholder activism, social policy should take into 
account these potential benefits. We leave the detailed analysis of these 
policy questions to Part III. Our present goal in the remainder of this Part is 
to contribute to scholarship on shareholder activism by gathering and 
analyzing data related to each of the three categories of negative activism. 
B. Empirical Evidence of Negative Activism 
In this section, we report a range of empirical evidence for each category 
of negative activism. We use a combination of data analysis and anecdotal 
evidence. The evidence not only establishes that negative activism is 
widespread and influential, but also illuminates the important distinctions 
among the three categories of negative activism. These distinctions are 
helpful when considering optimal regulatory and policy treatments of each 
form of negative activism. 
1. Informational Negative Activism 
There is abundant anecdotal evidence of informational negative activism. 
Harry Markopolos’s recent campaign against General Electric provides a 
recent controversial example. Immediately following his accusation that the 
company was engaged in accounting fraud, GE’s value declined by 11%, its 
largest decline in over a decade, eliminating $9 billion in GE’s market 
 
47. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 37; Partnoy & Thomas, 
supra note 28. 












capitalization.49 Numerous analysts were skeptical of Markopolos’s claim, 
and GE’s share price later recovered.50 Depending on when and how one 
analyzed the Markopolos-General Electric example, a wide range of 
conclusions might seem reasonable. Such anecdotal evidence is often 
unhelpful; anecdotes can be marshalled to support virtually any position. 
There has been significantly less comprehensive study of informational 
negative activism. Studying negative activism, of any type, presents 
challenges that are absent when studying positive activism. Most 
importantly, positive activists must publicly disclose their ownership stake 
through a Schedule 13D filing within ten days of crossing the 5% ownership 
threshold. 51  There are no analogous disclosure rules in place for short 
positions, of any size.52 Also, institutions with more than $100 million under 
management must publicly disclose their long positions in quarterly Form 
13F filings; these requirements do not apply to short positions. 53 
Accordingly, the two most important and reliable data sources for studying 
positive activism do not exist for the study of negative activism. 
In the absence of disclosure mandates, empirical analysis of short selling 
must rely on self-reporting. There are strong incentives for selection bias in 
self-reported incidents of negative activism, for both obvious and non-
obvious reasons. Negative activists have incentives to report their most 
persuasive positions in the most favorable light, and their unpersuasive 
positions not at all. Disclosures also can be made at any short selling 
threshold: someone who is short only a handful of shares with little money 
at risk can post a report online and then selectively boast about a subsequent 
stock price decrease. 
Less obviously, short sellers are generally reluctant to report their 
positions publicly. Many fund managers believe that disclosing positions 
can lead to “copycat investing,” making them reluctant to give away their 
informational advantages. 54  Additionally, evidence from Owen Lamont 
 
49. Shawn Tully, How the Man Who Nailed Madoff Got GE Wrong, FORTUNE (Oct. 3, 2019, 
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and accompanying text. 
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shows firms take legal and regulatory actions against disclosed short sellers 
by alleging criminal conduct, suing them, hiring private investigators, 
asking public authorities to investigate them, and manipulating securities 
markets to impede short selling.55  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there have been some attempts to 
analyze informational negative activism. In a 2016 article, Alexander 
Ljungqvist and Wenlan Qian reported on a study of 358 short-seller reports 
targeting 124 companies from 2006 to 2011.56 They find these reports have 
a significant impact on various forms of market activity. Short-seller reports 
are associated with more frequent trading and widen the bid-offer spreads 
for the targeted stocks, creating order imbalances and increasing volatility 
while significantly decreasing share prices.57 
In another 2016 article, Lei Chen considered 443 similar types of short-
selling reports from 2007 to 2014; these reports identified problems at 
several dozen Chinese firms listed on U.S. exchanges.58 This study found 
share prices of the targeted firms declined in reaction to these reports, as did 
prices at peer firms with the same auditor.59 Chen’s study reinforces the 
notion from Ljungqvist and Qian that self-reporting by informational 
negative activists can have a significant impact on markets. 
In a more comprehensive 2020 working paper, Wuyang Zhao reported 
results from a collection of more than 6,000 reports on negative activist 
events in Seeking Alpha, an online crowd-sourced investor reporting 
platform, as well as in Activist Shorts Research, a newsletter that tracks 
incidents of negative activism.60 Zhao confirmed that negative activism was 
associated with a statistically significant negative market reaction.61 Zhao 
and Yu Ting Forester Wong used the same data sources to confirm that 
 
pleads-for-rules-to-make-hedge-funds-reveal-short-positions (quoting hedge fund manager David 
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on US-Listed Chinese Firms, 43 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1444 (2016). 
59. Id. at 1476. 
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companies targeted by negative activists suffered decreases in investing, 
financing, and payout activities.62 
Most recently, Joshua Mitts analyzed a set of almost 3,000 anonymous 
negative activist reports in Seeking Alpha and found that reports are 
associated with significant, but short-term, decreases in the prices of 
targeted stocks. 63  Mitts characterized the results as consistent with 
misstatement manipulation, with the authors fabricating negative 
information to drive down stock prices.64 Authors also reportedly adopted 
new anonymous profiles once their credibility had been exhausted by the 
fabricated reports.65  
Finally, in a current working paper, Ian Appel, Jordan Bulka, and 
Vyacheslav Fos used a sample of 252 publicly disclosed short positions 
culled from Factiva’s media coverage from 1996 through 2015 to show 
these campaigns result in an average -7% abnormal return to the target.66 
The authors provide detailed findings broken down by allegation and 
several other factors and conclude that much of the abnormal return is 
driven by “active” allegations, rather than allegations about general firm 
overvaluation.67 
However, even as this interest in negative activism has increased, 
previous studies have not seriously examined important issues about the 
nature and categories of negative activism. We turn to these issues in the 
remainder of this section, beginning with a description of our efforts to 
contribute to scholarly understanding in this area. 
First, we developed a dataset of informational negative activism based 
on Activist Shorts Research reports from 2009 to 2016.68 We collected 825 
reports of negative activism and, following the coding methodology of 
Activist Shorts Research, we labeled each negative activist intervention as 
involving primary allegations of the following categories: accounting fraud; 
competitive pressure/industry issues; an upcoming dividend cut; an 
ineffective roll-up; major business fraud; questioning medical effectiveness; 
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since been sold to Activist Insight. See ACTIVIST INSIGHT, https://www.activistinsight.com/. 











misleading accounting; overvaluation; over-levered; ineffective product; 
fraudulent stock promotion; upcoming earnings miss; and other allegations 
of illegality. While we know the alleging party, we do not know the extent 
of the alleging party’s short position. 
We found a mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR)69  for targeted 
securities from one day before the negative activist’s public announcement 
through one day after the announcement of -6.99%. This finding is robust 
to other specifications of event windows: the CAR from three days before 
through three days after announcement is -7.20%, and from ten days before 
through one day after the return is -5.65%.70  
Table 1 dissects the announcement returns by primary allegation type. 
Allegations of major business fraud are associated with significant negative 
returns (-15.58%), as are allegations related to accounting fraud (-10.41%), 
ineffective products (-9.21%), and fraudulent stock promotion (-11.64%). 
As mentioned above, informational negative activism can involve either 
forward- or backwards-looking information. Table 1 therefore also 
categorizes the allegations into forward and backwards looking. The 
average CAR associated with backwards-looking allegations is -8.77%, 
while the average CAR associated with forward-looking allegations is            
-4.15%. 71  The results are sorted by aggregate market cap loss within 
backwards- and forward-looking allegations. 
 
Table 1 – Returns to Informational Negative Activism by Primary 
Allegation Category 












All 825 -6.99% -7.20% -5.65% $  (116.45) 
      
All backwards-looking: 507 -8.77% -9.75% -8.53% $  (104.53) 
Ineffective roll-up 36 -5.01% -6.99% -4.33% $  (196.73) 
Accounting fraud 63 -10.41% -13.71% -17.00% $  (175.38) 
Product ineffective 42 -9.21% -8.70% -2.02% $  (135.12) 
Misleading accounting 73 -3.94% -4.55% -6.13% $  (114.36) 
Over-levered 37 -8.79% -11.98% -6.50% $  (109.25) 
Major business fraud 77 -15.58% -17.88% -21.73% $   (82.63) 
Medical effectiveness 74 -5.82% -3.60% -0.12% $   (81.56) 
Other illegal 52 -7.01% -9.91% -8.47% $   (65.74) 
Stock promotion 53 -11.64% -9.99% -3.83% $   (18.57) 
 
69. CARs are calculated as the abnormal stock return relative to the value-weighted Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) index return surrounding the announcement period.  
70. The median numbers are slightly lower, but comparable. 
71. The difference in CAR between forward- and backwards-looking allegations is statistically 








2020] NEGATIVE ACTIVISM 1351 
 
 
       
All forward-looking: 318 -4.15% -3.13% -1.06% $  (135.44) 
Competitive pressures 127 -3.43% -3.87% -3.52% $  (155.67) 
Overvalued 159 -4.57% -1.60% 1.87% $  (129.54) 
Dividend cut coming 10 -12.80% -16.90% -16.14% $   (91.19) 
Upcoming earnings miss 22 -1.28% -3.60% -1.19% $   (81.59) 
 
Of course, because activists voluntarily choose to make these reports, our 
sample of self-reported activism is expected to be biased towards statistical 
significance. It is likely that many short sellers do not disclose their 
positions. There are two important points about such undisclosed short 
selling. First, to the extent undisclosed informational negative activism 
occurs, the aggregate amount of all informational negative activism 
obviously is higher than reported in our tables. Second, it is likely that 
undisclosed informational negative activism would, if it were disclosed, 
result in comparatively lower cumulative abnormal returns than the negative 
activism in our sample. Public disclosure brings the increased likelihood of 
litigation, regulatory costs, and reputational costs, 72  leading activists to 
disclose instances that promise the largest expected stock movements. But 
with no disclosure mandate, self-reported activism provides the best source 
of study. 
To determine activists’ success when braving these costs through public 
disclosure, we next examined how shorting success varies by individual 
activist. We identified fifty-one separate informational negative activists 
with at least three activist events. The list includes a wide range of short 
sellers, encompassing dedicated short-only activists and activists that 
implement strategies other than shorting. The complete list, along with 
associated mean cumulative abnormal returns, is set forth in Table 2.  
We sorted the data in Table 2 by average market capitalization loss to 
illustrate the relative economic impact of individual informational negative 
activists. The results are consistent with examples such as the Muddy 
Waters-NMC Health announcement that began this article regarding the 
success of informational negative activism, with some activists earning 
stunning returns. Many of the negative activists in the first rows of the chart 
are those with the most publicized reputations as short sellers. Out of the 
fifty-one negative activists, forty-eight have average CARs that are less than 
zero, in the negative activist’s desired direction. Overall, the announcement 
of negative information activism is associated with negative returns, 
although there is significant variation. 
 
 
72. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 











Table 2 – Returns to Individual Informational Negative Activists 















12 -9.97% -15.51% -20.15%  $(839.92) 
Dialectic 
Capital 
9 -1.17% -0.03% 1.95%  $(451.09) 
Kynikos 
Associates 
28 -1.84% -2.50% -5.45%  $(388.36) 
Prescience 
Point 
9 -13.88% -21.11% -26.40%  $(356.85) 
Muddy 
Waters 
15 -18.60% -22.45% -22.52%  $(299.21) 
Infitialis 5 -5.97% -6.20% -8.99%  $(278.97) 
Gotham City 
Research 
5 -19.30% -16.08% -15.64%  $(261.64) 
Citron 
Research 
61 -10.16% -7.66% -4.09%  $(258.78) 
J Capital 
Research 
4 -1.32% -4.33% -4.27%  $(253.79) 
Bronte 
Capital 
25 -10.79% -13.61% -18.20%  $(217.68) 
BlueMountain 
Capital 
4 -9.32% -15.55% -20.69%  $(217.49) 
Whitney 
Tilson 
19 -4.47% -4.92% -0.73%  $(203.89) 
Trinity 
Research 
3 -18.03% -7.62% -35.19%  $(172.49) 
Anonymous 
Analytics 
4 -3.51% -2.75% -7.51%  $(149.45) 
Greenwich 
Research 
5 -8.72% -13.62% -3.27%  $(142.89) 
Spotlight 
Research 
5 -4.23% -9.04% -5.56%  $(137.05) 
Friendly Bear 9 -9.44% -5.01% -3.17%  $(133.79) 
Asensio 4 4.97% 2.04% 1.63%  $ (96.61) 
Kerrisdale 
Capital 
26 -8.80% -8.11% -11.37%  $ (72.65) 
Gravity 
Research 
4 -11.36% -15.10% -5.93%  $ (71.72) 
Suhail Capital 8 -2.97% -1.44% -1.28%  $ (70.34) 
Spruce Point 
Capital 














10 -10.44% -2.68% -9.35%  $ (62.98) 
Forensic 
Factor 
6 -18.67% -11.66% -15.05%  $ (62.41) 
Cannell 
Capital 
5 -3.20% 4.03% 4.74%  $ (60.89) 
Cliffside 
Research 
5 -14.10% -14.65% -28.79%  $ (51.85) 
Lemelson 
Capital 
3 -1.39% -0.98% 8.84%  $ (50.04) 
Glaucus 
Research 
11 -7.08% -8.40% -16.19%  $ (47.05) 
Alfred Little 14 -12.43% -17.00% -23.58%  $ (45.92) 
GeoInvesting 46 -7.07% -11.02% -11.96%  $ (42.53) 
Xuhua Zhou 11 -1.28% -1.73% 1.32%  $ (36.48) 
Alecto 
Research 
3 -4.03% -3.32% 5.71%  $ (35.99) 




14 -12.48% -8.56% 8.67%  $ (34.41) 
Prescience 
Investment 
9 -9.75% -13.33% -14.06%  $ (31.07) 
Pump Stopper 18 -14.90% -13.05% -7.18%  $ (30.66) 
Martin 
Shkreli 
13 -8.67% -7.76% -13.92%  $ (27.62) 
Absaroka 
Capital 
5 -17.21% -10.24% -6.01%  $ (26.54) 
Real Talk 
Investments 
6 -3.55% -2.51% -8.04%  $ (22.82) 
Alpha 
Exposure 
17 -5.95% -8.69% -12.72%  $ (18.53) 
Street 
Sweeper 
132 -3.99% -2.60% 6.76%  $ (13.33) 
Melissa Davis 6 -6.20% -5.96% -11.35%  $ (11.65) 
Off Wall 
Street 
3 -0.58% -0.28% -1.31%  $  (6.86) 
Mako 
Research 
6 -2.38% -6.54% -2.79%  $  (5.59) 
Richard 
Pearson 
55 -7.11% -6.73% 0.51%  $  (1.39) 
Lakewood 
Capital 
25 -1.81% -1.67% -1.70%  $   1.14  
Aristides 
Capital 
6 -3.10% 3.57% -2.67%  $   8.18  
Copperfield 
Research 
14 -5.65% -8.15% -7.08%  $  41.62  
Marc 
Cohodes 
6 1.06% 0.00% -2.12%  $  42.50  











Matt Berry 6 4.26% 2.87% 11.46%  $  66.89  
Cable Car 
Capital 
5 -0.45% -2.74% 0.21%  $ 130.81  
 
Next, we examine long-run returns of the firms targeted by informational 
negative activists to determine if the market reaction is temporary or persists 
over the long term. Figure 1 plots the mean and median buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) from thirty trading days prior to the negative 
activist’s campaign to three hundred trading days afterwards. The negative 
market reaction at the activist’s announcement is not fleeting. Target firms’ 
poor performance persists after the initial revelation. These results are 
robust to various asset-pricing models. In unreported tests, we conduct 
formal long-term return analyses using calendar-time portfolio regressions. 
We form a portfolio by holding all target firms for twelve months after the 
activists’ announcement, and we estimate a regression of the portfolio’s 
excess returns on the Fama-French three-factor model as well as the 
momentum factor. The monthly alphas for the three- and four-factor models 
range from -1.959% to -1.734% for equal-weighted portfolios and are 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  
 
Figure 1 – Informational Negative Activism Long-Run Returns 
 
 
Table 3 shows long-run returns by allegation type for the one-year period 
after the announcement. For consistency, we report the allegations in the 
same order as in Table 1. For the full sample, the average (median) buy-
and-hold abnormal return is -22.43% (-29.51%). The magnitude of the 
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allegations versus forward-looking allegations. Out of the 825 campaigns, 
593, or 71.88%, have abnormal long-run returns that are negative. 
 
Table 3 – Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Return by Allegation 
Allegation N One-Year Average 
Buy-And-Hold 
Abnormal Return  
One-Year Median 
Buy-And-Hold 
Abnormal Return  
 All 825 -22.43% -29.51% 
    
Backwards-looking: 507 -24.27% -36.61% 
Stock promotion 53 -46.64% -56.60% 
Product ineffective 42 -44.58% -43.32% 
Major business fraud 77 -34.90% -47.51% 
Medical effectiveness 74 -20.50% -38.09% 
Other illegal 52 -17.26% -28.70% 
Accounting fraud 63 -15.70% -33.22% 
Misleading accounting 73 -13.84% -16.64% 
Ineffective roll-up 36 -13.42% -15.08% 
Over-levered 37 -10.28% -33.35% 
  
   
Forward-looking: 318 -19.49% -20.83% 
Dividend cut coming 10 -27.68% -26.46% 
Overvalued 159 -22.90% -27.02% 
Competitive pressures 127 -16.82% -17.67% 
Upcoming earnings miss 22 -6.60% -1.90% 
 
As Table 3 shows, the announcement of informational negative activism 
is associated with significant and negative cumulative abnormal returns, 
which persist during the subsequent one-year holding period. In other words, 
informational negative activism occurs in a variety of ways, with different 
types of allegations, but is consistently associated with long-run negative 
returns.  
2. Operational Negative Activism  
What we label operational negative activism is distinguished from 
informational negative activism in that it tries to change the operational 
aspects of a company’s business in some substantive way. Whereas 
informational negative activism seeks to inform the markets about the true 
valuation of a company, based on the assumption that the current prices 
reflect an inflated valuation, operational negative activism seeks to change 
the underlying state of the company and, hence, its valuation.  











It is worth noting up front that the line between informational and 
operational negative activism may not be clear in every instance. We 
suggest that one way to delineate between the two is to consider whether 
the activist does more than merely revealing information to the marketplace. 
Thus, publishing a report stating that a patent is invalid would be 
informational; filing an action to challenge the patent’s validity would be 
operational. The two types of activism can, of course, be linked in 
circumstances like these. 
We are not aware of any databases that systematically collect instances 
of operational negative activism. Accordingly, our examination of 
operational negative activism must necessarily be anecdotal. Nevertheless, 
it is apparent that, as with informational negative activism, there is a wide 
range of behavior that constitutes operational negative activism, and this 
behavior yields a wide range of effects. 
We are aware of two prominent categories of operational negative 
activism for which some data are available. The first involves challenging a 
firm’s patents. In 2015, a group of hedge funds managed by Kyle Bass 
shorted shares in pharmaceutical companies and then filed more than two 
dozen challenges to those companies’ patents using the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office inter partes review process. 73  This review process 
enables a party to “request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a 
patent” based on doctrines of novelty and obviousness.74 Bass’s strategy of 
attempting to disable patents held by targeted firms was controversial and 
received extensive media attention.75 
Bass’s initial challenges coincided with statistically significant declines 
in the stock prices of targeted firms.76 The first challenge, on February 10, 
2015, was associated with abnormal returns of -11.94%, and subsequent 
 
73. See Sidak & Skog, supra note 8, at 122.  
74. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2018). For more on that patent review process, see Christopher J. Walker 
& Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141 (2019). 
75. See, e.g., Susan Decker, Bass Battled U.S. Drug Patents and Prices but Lost to ‘Cabal,’ 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-10/bass-ba 
ttled-u-s-drug-patents-and-prices-but-lost-to-cabal [https://perma.cc/6DUQ-3HEL]; Daniel Fisher, 
Hard Times for Patent Trolls and Challengers as Courts, Targets Fight Back, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2017, 
9:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2017/03/24/hard-times-for-patent-trolls-and-chall 
engers-as-courts-targets-fight-back/#248963b42e7f [https://perma.cc/GW9Z-AD6T]; Joseph Walker, 
Hayman Capital’s Kyle Bass Vows to Continue Drug-Patent Challenges, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2015, 
6:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hayman-capitals-kyle-bass-vows-to-continue-drug-patent-chal 
lenges-1441320971 [https://perma.cc/8BMM-DLFX]; Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge 
Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short the Stock, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), https://www.w 
sj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408 [ht 
tps://perma.cc/G537-474F]. 












challenges imposed movements of -4.63% and -2.59%. 77  These patent 
challenges are an example of operational negative activism: they seek to 
profit by disabling a company’s patents and harming that company’s future 
profits.  
However, in Bass’s case, the ultimate success of the strategy was mixed 
at best. Over time, market reactions to his challenges grew less predictable, 
perhaps reflecting a market perception that the strategy was unlikely to 
impact the targeted companies’ values.78 In all, only 26% of his challenges 
were met with favorable rulings from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB).79 
A second well-documented category of operational negative activism 
involves the practice of coupling a short position with voting shares 
associated with long positions, giving rise to what has been described as 
“empty voting” or “encumbered shares.”80 For example, Mason Capital took 
a long position in Telus voting shares and a countervailing short position in 
Telus non-voting shares, and then attempted to deter Telus from undertaking 
a desirable recapitalization in which its voting and non-voting shares would 
collapse into a single class.81 Another example involved a group of hedge 
funds accused of shorting shares in a Henderson Land subsidiary.82 The 
funds acquired significant voting rights while maintaining a net short 
position and used their voting right to block the favorable acquisition of the 
subsidiary. 83  A final prominent example is the case of activist Perry 
Corporation’s failed attempt to push through Mylan Laboratories’ takeover 
of King Pharmaceuticals.84 Mylan had proposed an acquisition of King on 
terms that were favorable to King, which would have led to an increase in 
King’s stock price and a decrease in Mylan’s. Perry held a long interest of 
five million shares in King and a short interest of approximately four million 
shares in Mylan; both positions would have paid off if the acquisition went 
through. In an attempt to force the transaction against mounting Mylan 
shareholder resistance, Perry acquired the right to vote 9.89% of Mylan’s 
 
77. See id. at 136–37 tbl.2. These negative returns quickly dissipated, and many of the later 
challenges were associated with positive abnormal returns, perhaps because Bass’s initial challenges 
were later denied by the PTAB. Id. at 138–42, 147–48. 
78. Id. at 138–42, 147–48. 
79. Jeffrey Kuo & Afia Naaz, Attack on Pharma Patents: Checking in on the Kyle Bass IPRs, 
POLSINELLI ON POST-GRANT (June 2, 2017), https://polsinellionpostgrant.com/blog/2017/6/2/attack-on-
pharma-patents-checking-in-on-the-kyle-bass-iprs [https://perma.cc/8P9P-BX8Q]. 
80. Hu & Black, supra note 11; Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 775. 
81. Partnoy, supra note 39, at 100, 111. 
82. Hu & Black, supra note 11, at 834–35. 
83. Id. 
84. For coverage of this transaction, see In re Perry Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 60,351, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2907, 96 SEC Docket 1240, 2009 WL 2163550 (July 21, 2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60351.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELJ4-6J27]. 











shares, while still maintaining a net short position in Mylan, and then used 
those votes to encourage the transaction. 
In addition to these two situations of operational negative activism, there 
is some anecdotal evidence regarding other strategies. Two events from the 
introduction provide examples: the employee-saboteur at Tesla,85 and the 
soccer team bus bomber. 86  There are other examples as well, such as 
Andrew Auernheimer, a “hacktivist” known as “weev.” He had been 
convicted for revealing a privacy flaw in an AT&T server, but the 
conviction was later reversed and vacated. He then announced plans to start 
a hedge fund that would profit from taking short positions in companies and 
then targeting their technological vulnerabilities.87 
In the extreme, operational negative activism can be obviously 
detrimental to a company, and is socially deleterious as well. Consider, for 
example, the potential effects of terrorist activities on stock prices.88 In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York, investigations were made into 
whether terrorists, or related individuals or entities, took short positions in 
shares of American and United Airlines, the two companies whose planes 
were involved in the terrorists incidents.89 Note the perhaps obvious point. 
Terrorist attacks negatively impact stock prices by doing more than simply 
revealing negative information: they actually negatively impact the 
operations of the target company, both by destroying corporate assets and 
potentially increasing future costs and risks. 
More generally, an individual or organization could seek to profit from 
actions that damage a company by taking a short position in advance of 
those actions. Short sellers can use corporate espionage and industry 
warfare to harm the operations of a company. Existing concerns include 
cyberattacks and bioterrorism, which have raised fears about targeting a 
wide range of vulnerable potential corporate victims, particularly including 
 
85. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
87. John Biggs, Weev Talks About Life in Prison and His Plans to Open a Hedge Fund, TRO LLC, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 15, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2014/04/15/weev-talks-about-life-in-pri 
son-and-his-plans-to-open-a-hedge-fund-tro-llc/ [https://perma.cc/6UPY-TGH3]. It does not appear that 
TRO LLC, weev’s fund, has yet been successful in raising significant amounts of money. 
88. See, e.g., G. Andrew Karolyi & Rodolfo Martell, Terrorism and the Stock Market, 2 INT’L 
REV. APPLIED FIN. ISSUES & ECON. 285 (2010) (assessing the relationship between terrorist activity and 
stock performance); G. Andrew Karolyi, An Assessment of Terrorism-Related Investing Strategies, J. 
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 2008, at 108, 108 (finding a small but statistically significant return from 
terrorist-related investment strategies). 
89. The events of 9/11 clearly impacted many stocks, bonds, and commodities. Studies of the 
potential link between the attacks and the increased trading in put options of American and United 
Airlines were inconclusive. See, e.g., Neil A. Doherty et al., Insuring September 11th: Market Recovery 












the transportation and food industries. 90  Or hedge funds might short 
companies and then publicly push those companies to engage in costly 
socially responsible behavior, so the hedge fund can profit from subsequent 
share price declines.91 
Employees are another potential example of operational negative 
activism, especially when they leave their employment. Numerous 
companies report employees engaging in sabotage and other criminal 
conduct when they are fired from their jobs.92 Many such activities have the 
potential to impact a company’s stock price.  
Historically, labor unions have been activists in a range of ways, 
involving both social and economic issues; David Webber recently has 
described how labor unions do, and might, use their power as shareholders 
to pursue various activist goals.93  But labor unions also could take the 
opposite approach and implement an interesting version of operational 
negative activism by recognizing one simple fact: labor strikes cause stock 
price declines. The reason is that strikes disrupt company operations and the 
expectation of those disruptions is reflected in stock prices, often 
immediately. For example, shares of General Motors fell 5% between 
September 15 and October 25, 2019, the start and end of the recent labor 
strike; at one point during the strike they were down over 12%.94  
Might labor unions engage in negative operational activism to capture 
some of the profits associated with related share price declines? If labor 
unions had shorted shares of General Motors before striking, they could 
 
90. See, e.g., Joshua Mitts & Eric Talley, Informed Trading and Cybersecurity Breaches, 9 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2019) (studying trading in securities in advance of cybersecurity attacks); Mike Adams, 
Chipotle Is a Victim of Corporate Sabotage, NAT. NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.naturalnew 
s.com/052405_Chipotle_ecoli_outbreak_corporate_sabotage_biotech_bioterrorism.html [https://perm 
a.cc/7E8H-STGE] (speculating, without evidence, that biotech industry food terrorists planted e-coli at 
Chipotle restaurants in retaliation for its anti-genetically modified foods menu); Vince Bond Jr., 
Automakers Grapple with Rising Tide of Industrial Espionage, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Sept. 30, 2012, 
1:00 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20120930/OEM01/120929845/automakers-grapple-with-
rising-tide-of-industrial-espionage [https://perma.cc/7PM5-5AJ2] (describing increases in industrial 
espionage at car manufacturers, including Toyota, Ford, and General Motors). 
91. For more on how to incentivize costly corporate social responsibility, see Dorothy S. Lund, 
Making Corporate Social Responsibility Pay (USC Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Paper No. CLASS20-3, 
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3511631 [https://perma.cc/4K5F-GWSA]. 
92. See, e.g., Anca Bradley, How to Handle the Disgruntled Employee Out to Sabotage Your 
Business, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/250920 [https://perma. 
cc/LNW4-Q7WN] (describing examples of employee sabotage including a “digital bomb” designed to 
delete all of a company’s programs to cost it millions of dollars in sales, and noting that half of employees 
who leave a company take confidential corporate data). 
93. See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST 
BEST WEAPON (2018) (describing the recent history of labor union shareholder activism).  
94. Nora Naughton, As GM Workers Approve New Labor Deal, UAW Ends 40-Day Strike, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2019, 5:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-gm-workers-approve-new-labor-deal-
uaw-ends-40-day-strike-11572036798?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=13 [https://perma.cc/FN4E-
HMX5]. 











have made significant gains. Labor unions potentially could use profits from 
the share price declines associated with the announcement of strikes to fund 
not only the strikes themselves, but potentially other operations or expenses.  
Finally, one could foresee that investment funds that have sold their 
investment position between a company’s record date and its voting date 
would have reason to engage in operational negative activism. Since the 
fund no longer has an economic stake in the company, it can vote its shares 
without experiencing any of the economic ramifications from the vote. 
Engaging in operational negative activism by voting those shares to harm 
the company can actually benefit the fund, if competitor funds hold shares 
in that company.  
In all, operational negative activism encompasses a hodgepodge of 
strategies. Some of these strategies might seem unlikely to occur in practice; 
others have already occurred, in limited ways.  
3. Unintentional Negative Activism  
Our third category of negative activism involves attempts at positive 
activism that are nevertheless associated with negative announcement 
returns. This unintentional negative activism is therefore attempted positive 
activism that is regarded negatively in the market. In these situations, a 
positive shareholder activist taking a long position in a targeted company’s 
shares does not intend (and loses from) a negative market reaction: hence, 
our use of the term unintentional.95 
Unintentional negative activism is a phenomenon that has not been 
addressed in the literature on hedge fund activism. Empirical studies of 
positive activism have recognized that there is a range of announcement 
returns, but the distribution of those returns has received little attention.96 
For example, in a recent study, C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy, and 
Randall Thomas examined the announcement returns for hedge fund 
activists from 2008 through 2014 to determine which hedge fund 
characteristics and behavior were associated with positive announcement 
returns.97 They found that measures of clout and expertise were associated 
with higher returns, whereas frequency of intervention was not.98 They did 
 
95. Analogously, we might think of the concept of unintentional positive activists: activists 
taking short positions whose efforts instead produce increases in share prices. Table 2, supra pp. 20–22, 
reveals several of these unintentional positive activists, which we discuss later in this section. 
96. For example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 37; Partnoy 
& Thomas, supra note 28. 













not, however, examine specifically those interventions in their data that 
produced negative announcement returns.99 
We obtained data from Krishnan, Partnoy, and Thomas to examine how 
positive activist interventions were associated with negative announcement 
returns. We found that a significant number of attempted positive 
interventions were associated with abnormal negative returns.100 As shown 
in Figure 2 and Table 4, roughly one third of interventions had 
announcement returns that were negative. For the subgroup of positive 
activism campaigns that resulted in an initial negative market reaction, the 
average CAR[-10,1] was -7.26%, compared to 11.26% for the subgroup of 
campaigns that resulted in an initial positive market reaction.  
 
Figure 2 – Histogram of Positive Activism CAR 
 
Table 4 – Unintentional Negative Activism from 13-D Filings 
Returns N % Negative P25 Median Mean P75 
CAR[-10,1] 438 29.22% -0.68% 3.95% 5.86% 11.72% 
CAR[-1,1] 438 26.94% -0.15% 2.32% 3.62% 6.35% 
CAR[-3,3] 438 29.68% -0.75% 2.63% 3.84% 7.96% 
 
The incidence of negative returns varied across the population of positive 
activist hedge funds. Numerous funds had at least one intervention during 
the sample period that was associated with negative returns upon 
announcement. Measuring the return from ten days before announcement to 
 
99. Id. 
100. Because the data come from filings required when the activist acquires at least 5% of a voting 
share, it is typically assumed that these activists attempt positive changes. Id. An alternative explanation 
could be that these activists have significant, undisclosed short interests that outweigh their positive 
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one day after, several activists had negative announcement returns for half 
or more of their interventions.101  
We report the twenty lowest announcement returns in the sample in 
Table 5. We are not suggesting any particular reason for the market reaction 
in any specific instance. Each example is associated with a unique set of 
facts. 
 
Table 5 – Top 20 Worst Announcement Returns of Positive Activists 
Date Name CAR 
[-10,1] 
Hedge Fund 
2/23/2011 LECG CORP -81.26% T2 Partners 
8/22/2011 ALLIANCE 
HEALTHCARE  
-36.05% Discovery Group 
8/13/2012 HORIZON PHARMA PLC -32.61% Discovery Capital 
11/7/2011 AMBASSADORS GROUP 
INC 
-25.25% Lane Five Capital 
Management 
9/27/2011 CHINA CERAMICS CO 
LTD 
-25.12% James Dunning 
8/18/2011 INDUSTRIAL SERVICES 
AM 
-25.04% David Russell 
7/2/2013 GOLDEN MINERALS CO -21.89% Trishield Special 
Situations 
11/4/2013 VOLCANO CORP -20.95% Engaged Capital 
9/26/2011 CELSION CORP -20.68% Mangrove Partners 
3/20/2014 NOVATEL WIRELESS 
INC 
-20.25% Novatel Shareholders 
for Change 
8/9/2013 PENNEY (J C) CO -19.20% Perry Corp. 
2/7/2014 CARBONITE INC -18.68% Discovery Group 
7/18/2013 US AUTO PARTS 
NETWORK 
-18.36% Maguire Asset 
Management 
12/23/2011 SILICON GRAPHICS 
INTL 
-18.11% Wasatch Advisors, Inc. 
2/22/2013 BLOUNT INTL INC -17.30% P2 Capital 
1/12/2012 LIVEDEAL INC -16.74% Isaac Capital Group 
LLC 
8/16/2013 JAVELIN MORTGAGE -16.43% Bulldog Investors 
2/13/2012 BRINKS CO -16.40% GAMCO Investors 
 
101. These funds include Clover Partners, Red Mountain Capital, Greggory Schneider, Meson 
Capital Partners, Mill Road Capital, Western Investment, Discovery Capital, and GAMCO Partners. 












11/13/2012 SANDRIDGE ENERGY 
INC 
-16.32% TPG -Axon 
Management 
9/27/2012 QUALSTAR CORP -16.31% Lloyd Miller 
 
These negative returns can be categorized into two groups. One category 
includes negative reactions that occur for reasons independent of the 
activist’s disclosure and impending activism. These are the situations where 
independent negative developments coincide with the activist’s disclosure. 
Given the number of activist campaigns, sheer chance dictates that the 
positive activist will occasionally be unlucky in this way. Some of the 
events in Table 5 fall into this category; since we selected for the most 
significant negative returns, this finding is unsurprising. For example, just 
after T2 Partners acquired its stake in LECG with a “belief that the [s]hares, 
when purchased, were undervalued,”102 LECG announced a credit event and, 
within the month, was liquidated.103 While T2’s investment thesis may not 
have worked out, it can hardly be said that they caused LECG’s credit event; 
T2’s negative return might therefore be better attributed to bad luck, rather 
than unintentional negative activism. 
The other category of negative returns, and the one that we view as 
unintentional negative activism, encompasses instances where the activist’s 
disclosure of her stake leads to a share price decline. The market sees the 
activist as bad for the company’s future performance. For example, the 
activist might have, in the market’s opinion, bad plans for the target’s future 
business. Or, in the market’s opinion, the activist activities might impose 
costs on the company’s capable management, perhaps by distracting 
management by waging a costly proxy contest. 
Bill Ackman’s activism at Target provides an example. Although he and 
his fund have had several successful investments, his long stake in Target 
was not one of them. Fresh off a successful engagement with Wendy’s 
restaurant chain, Ackman acquired a 9.6% ownership stake in Target in July 
2007. Target’s price increased leading up to Ackman’s public disclosure on 
July 16, but upon his actual disclosure, the stock traded sharply lower, down 
2% on the announcement date.104 Investors were disappointed that the bulk 
of Ackman’s investment took the form of call options, rather than traditional 
long stakes, leading to his later being derided as a “short-term 
 
102. T2 Partners Management, LP, Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D) (Feb. 23, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1192305/000139834411000422/fp0002576_sc13d.htm [http 
s://perma.cc/BD5A-BKMA]. 
103. Joe Weisenthal, Whitney Tilson’s Latest Embarrassment: XPRT Down 80% Just Days After 
He Took an Activist Stake, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 28, 2011, 11:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
whitney-tilson-lecg-2011-2 [https://perma.cc/7DYE-M73T]. 
104. Lisa Gewirtz-Ward & John E. Morris, Pershing Buys 9.6% Stake in Target, DAILY DEAL, 
July 17, 2007, 2007 WLNR 13634714. 











speculator.”105 Others were puzzled at the lack of specificity in Ackman’s 
plans for Target: He disclosed only his belief that Target’s common stock 
“is undervalued and [his] inten[t] to discuss with management ways in 
which this undervaluation can be corrected.”106 The lack of specificity led 
investors to speculate fairly widely about Ackman’s future plans. Some 
thought he might increase Target’s leverage or spin off its real estate 
holdings.107 Others believed he would increase Target’s credit card business, 
while still others believed he would instead spin off its credit card 
business.108 Finally, several thought Ackman would provide little positive 
change. An analyst at HSBC summed up this position by noting, “I don’t 
see how you can make this company perform significantly better.”109 By the 
end of the month, Target’s share price had dropped well below the levels 
leading up to Ackman’s announcement. 
During the following two years, Ackman pushed for various reforms at 
Target, but his efforts were met with little success from Target’s board.110 
Finally, he waged a proxy contest in 2009 to get five of his nominees elected 
to Target’s board. None of his nominees were ultimately elected; indeed, 
none received more than 20% of the vote.111 The proxy contest cost Ackman 
approximately $9 million and Target $11 million, in addition to the 
distraction from running their respective businesses. 112  Ackman finally 
 
105. See, e.g., Zachery Kouwe, Shareholders Support Target over Ackman, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (May 28, 2009, 3:02 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/shareholder-support-
target-in-blow-to-ackman/ [https://perma.cc/SXH3-599R]. 
106. Pershing Square Capital Management, LP, Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D) 8 
(July 16, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/27419/000090266407002284/sc13d.txt [http 
s://perma.cc/MDX7-S9PY]. 
107. Gewirtz-Ward & Morris, supra note 104. 
108. Id.; Parija B. Kavilanz, Hedge Fund Takes Aim at Target, CNNMONEY (July 16, 2007, 12:00 
PM), https://money.cnn.com/2007/07/16/news/companies/target_pershing/index.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
9TEG-XWCN]. 
109. Kavilanz, supra note 108. 
110. Joe Nocera, Investor Exits and Leaves Puzzlement, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2009), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/05/30/business/30nocera.html [https://perma.cc/JU7S-8CPH]. 
111. Id. 
112. Mike Coronato, 2017 Proxy Fights: High Cost, Low Volume, FACTSET (Nov. 6, 2017), http 
s://insight.factset.com/2017-proxy-fights-high-cost-low-volume [https://perma.cc/ZH48-YWG4] 
(estimating overall proxy contest costs at $20 million); Nicole Maestri, Ackman Loses in Target Proxy 
Contest, REUTERS (May 28, 2009, 12:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-target/ackman-loses-
in-target-proxy-contest-idUSTRE54R11420090528 [https://perma.cc/H6DS-E699] (reporting 
estimated costs to Target of $11 million); see generally Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders Strongly 
Reject Dissident Slate, Ending Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), https://www.nytime 
s.com/2009/05/29/business/29target.html [https://perma.cc/9CYK-DMDE] (quoting hedge fund activist 
advisor as saying, “I guarantee you that every single Target board discussion over the last six months 
has been about this proxy fight and not about setting the business strategy of the company”); Nocera, 
supra note 110 (characterizing the campaign as “a huge, expensive distraction for a company trying to 












exited his position in 2011 at a substantial loss.113 
GAMCO Investors provides another useful perspective into how 
attempted positive activism can instead result in negative returns. Our 
rationale for focusing on GAMCO is twofold. First, GAMCO is not a typical 
positive shareholder activist. Founded by Mario Gabelli in 1977, GAMCO 
was for decades a fundamental value investor, only later forming an activist 
fund.114 Unlike most U.S. activists, GAMCO is not located in Manhattan; 
instead, its $36 billion is managed from the suburb of Rye, New York. 
Moreover, GAMCO holds many of its investments in mutual and closed-
end funds, not hedge funds, and its average holding period for activist 
investments is over nine years.115 
Second, GAMCO generally does not engage in activist tactics that have 
been found to be associated with the highest announcement returns. 116 
GAMCO favors precatory, non-binding proposals, and it avoids mounting 
expensive proxy fights, instead relying on advisors or other shareholders to 
propose how a company might accommodate GAMCO.117  
We selected a random sample window from January 2016 to September 
2018 to examine GAMCO’s 13D filings. During this period, GAMCO 
regularly filed a new 13D every few weeks, forty-eight in all during the 
thirty-three-month window.118  
We find that the average [-10,1] CAR for the forty-eight GAMCO 13D 
filings was 1.98%, well below the 7% average CAR for positive activists 
that has been widely documented in the literature. The returns are highly 
variable: of the forty-eight filings, twenty-six had negative CARs (54% of 
the announcements). These data are set forth in Table 6 below.  
 
 
113. Shira Ovide, Bill Ackman Throws in the Towel on Target, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2011, 5:59 
PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/05/16/bill-ackman-throws-in-the-towel-on-target/ [https://perma. 
cc/UY64-W3NA]. 
114. See, e.g., Andy Kern, A Private Market Value Primer from Mario Gabelli, SEEKING ALPHA 
(Apr. 27, 2007, 4:00 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/33657-a-private-market-value-primer-from-
mario-gabelli [https://perma.cc/A4WV-5BGD]; Activist Gabelli Value Plus Trust Raises £101M at 
Launch, WEALTH MANAGER, http://www.gabelli.co.uk/activist-gabelli-value-plus-trust-raises-101m-at 
-launch/ [https://perma.cc/R8VY-UBXN]. 
115. See Sheeraz Raza, Gamco Investors’ First Proxy Access Nomination to the Board of National 
Fuel Gas, VALUE WALK (Nov. 11, 2016, 10:13 AM), https://www.valuewalk.com/2016/11/gamco-prox 
y-access/ [https://perma.cc/X22Q-JBXP]. 
116. See Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13 (finding that high announcement returns are 
associated with the willingness to engage in proxy fights and litigation, among other variables 
demonstrating clout and expertise). 
117. See 13D Filings: Gamco Gets Active, BARRON’S (Apr. 24, 2015, 11:50 PM), http://www.barr 
ons.com/articles/13d-filings-gamco-gets-active-1429933831 [https://perma.cc/74TW-BD2S]. Indeed, 
GAMCO’s general counsel has cited the appeal of reduced-cost activism, saying “you can piggyback on 
someone else’s proxy.” Raza, supra note 115. 
118. The average lag between filing dates during the sample period was twenty days, with a 
minimum time between filing dates of eight days and a maximum of thirty-four days.  











Table 6 – GAMCO Positive Activism 
Ticker Event Date Filing Date CAR[-10,1] CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,3] 
OCAT 12/31/2015 1/6/2016 2.35% 4.41% 7.56% 
GYRO 1/12/2016 1/21/2016 9.33% -3.87% 0.42% 
MLNK 2/8/2016 2/18/2016 -7.58% 4.19% -14.36% 
POWR 3/8/2016 3/17/2016 -3.55% -2.18% -1.66% 
SNAK 3/30/2016 4/4/2016 -3.57% -0.96% -1.03% 
AFOP 4/25/2016 5/5/2016 2.26% 0.43% -0.59% 
EPC 5/20/2016 5/25/2016 -0.53% -0.97% -0.15% 
CST 6/2/2016 6/2/2016 16.71% 15.56% 16.51% 
LORL 6/29/2016 7/6/2016 -10.55% -4.72% -3.29% 
GDL 2/8/2016 7/18/2016 -2.76% -0.06% -0.85% 
SGI 8/12/2016 8/22/2016 33.27% -0.08% 0.16% 
FLTX 8/31/2016 9/8/2016 2.34% 2.70% 1.90% 
GI 10/13/2016 10/20/2016 1.18% 0.51% -0.15% 
HTZ 1/3/2017 1/4/2017 2.75% 7.07% 5.63% 
CPPL 12/28/2016 1/4/2017 -1.24% -1.88% -1.07% 
VASC 1/23/2017 1/31/2017 -0.16% 0.79% 0.12% 
CLC 1/26/2017 2/2/2017 -1.28% -0.84% 0.18% 
CLCD 1/27/2017 2/2/2017 -0.98% -0.66% 0.52% 
RLJE 1/27/2017 2/6/2017 15.79% 2.50% 7.34% 
AFI 3/7/2017 3/17/2017 -12.38% 3.37% -0.67% 
GSOL 3/17/2017 3/27/2017 -6.18% -7.12% -6.53% 
INNL 4/11/2017 4/20/2017 15.78% -3.44% 6.32% 
MWA 5/16/2017 5/17/2017 0.18% 0.39% 0.33% 
GENC 5/23/2017 6/1/2017 -0.51% -0.26% 0.05% 
NUTR 6/12/2017 6/21/2017 -0.31% 0.63% -0.10% 
LMCA 6/15/2017 6/23/2017 -1.30% 2.34% 7.46% 
TISI 7/1/2617 7/28/2017 -41.12% -1.96% -45.53% 
NVDQ 8/4/2017 8/16/2017 0.91% 1.25% 0.31% 
GUID 8/30/2017 9/7/2017 -0.69% -0.31% -0.95% 
SMIT 10/11/2017 10/20/2017 5.99% 5.07% 18.19% 












OME 11/9/2017 11/13/2017 0.20% 0.49% 0.03% 
MGCD 12/9/2017 12/19/2017 -1.57% -0.60% -0.74% 
RDI 12/22/2017 12/26/2017 -2.36% -1.34% 4.34% 
TMST 12/28/2017 1/2/2018 19.21% 9.79% 7.06% 
CCC 12/29/2017 1/8/2018 -2.77% -0.40% -2.33% 
KTEC 1/25/2018 2/1/2018 46.88% 1.89% 5.98% 
ONDK 2/5/2018 2/15/2018 21.90% 8.18% 22.16% 
RLJE 2/26/2018 2/28/2018 14.73% 5.40% 15.52% 
SPA 3/5/2018 3/9/2018 -25.29% 2.29% 2.52% 
GEF 3/16/2018 3/20/2018 12.14% 5.57% 2.52% 
FLL 3/23/2018 3/28/2018 5.01% 2.59% -6.14% 
GDL 3/26/2018 3/29/2018 3.16% 0.55% -1.36% 
NPO 6/6/2018 6/12/2018 -0.95% 1.44% 1.28% 
INFU 8/14/2018 8/24/2018 -7.31% -4.26% -1.78% 
JMBA 8/30/2018 9/7/2018 -0.27% 0.37% 0.78% 
GCP 9/19/2018 9/20/2018 0.29% 1.76% 3.81% 
XRM 9/14/2018 9/24/2018 -1.71% 0.61% 0.53% 
    Average 1.98% 1.18% 1.04% 
 
The point of singling out GAMCO is not criticism. The data illustrate the 
significant variation in market reactions to announcements of attempted 
positive activism. It was not apparent from our analysis of GAMCO’s 
announcements that there is an easily discernible pattern to predict which 
announced interventions will be associated with negative market reactions. 
Market reactions vary widely for different interventions, and for different 
activists, and sometimes occur for reasons entirely independent of the 
activist’s announcement.  
In sum, although positive activism is associated with positive returns on 
average, that conclusion does not always hold. Many interventions, and 
many funds, are associated with negative announcement returns. It is these 
interventions that we label as unintentional negative activism.  
Finally, we briefly assess the mirror of unintentional negative activism: 
unintentional positive activism. Of the examples of informational negative 
activism in our database, approximately one quarter were associated with 
positive CARs. In other words, the market reaction to the short seller’s 











announcement was positive, leading to losses for the short seller. The data 
are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 7.119 
 
Figure 3 – Histogram of Negative Activism [-1,1] and [-10,1] CARs 
 
Table 7 – Unintentional Positive Activism 
Returns N %Positive P25 Median Mean P75 
CAR[-10,1] 825 38.66% -19.15% -4.97% -5.63% 7.29% 
CAR[-1,1] 825 27.52% -11.53% -4.36% -6.98% 0.46% 
CAR[-3,3] 825 29.09% -14.12% -5.15% -7.20% 0.94% 
 
As with unintentional negative activism, we find that the incidence of 
unintentional positive activism varies across the sample of negative activists. 
Out of the 825 observations, 319 campaigns were associated with a positive 
market reaction, with a mean (median) CAR[-10,1] of 18.06% (11.05%). 
Numerous funds have at least one event during the sample period that was 
associated with positive returns upon announcement, with several having 
positive announcement returns for half or more of their short allegations.120 
Since disclosure of short positions is voluntary and costly, finding so many 
failed yet disclosed investments is striking. 
III. REGULATING NEGATIVE ACTIVISM 
As the prior Part reveals, negative activism not only comprises a 
significant portion of activism as a whole, but also can be grouped into three 
 
119. The fact that the percentage of failed short activism matches the percentage of failed positive 
activism may suggest minimal bias from the short dataset’s reliance on self-reporting.  
120. As measured by [-10,1] CARs, these funds include Dialectic Capital, Lemelson Capital, Matt 
Berry, Bleeker Street Research, Cannell Capital, Street Sweeper, Asensio, GeoInvesting, Gravity 
Research Group, and Mako Research. There are, of course, a range of explanations for the market 
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distinct categories. Before turning to the policy implications from this 
analysis, we review the current state of activism regulation. 
Financial markets are governed by several significant regulatory regimes. 
Although hedge funds and other activist investors commonly use 
exemptions to escape many of them, 121  this is not to say that activist 
investing is an entirely unregulated space. In addition to certain provisions 
that directly affect either positive or negative activism, activism of any sort 
is governed by general securities antifraud statutes. The Exchange Act’s 
section 10(b) general antifraud provision attaches to deceptive conduct in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 122  With no direct 
disclosure mechanism, 123  section 10(b) is instead primarily aimed at 
deterring undesirable behavior.  
Section 10(b) encompasses securities manipulation (deceptive conduct 
that controls or artificially affects the market for a security),124 securities 
fraud (deceptive or false statements, often made by company management, 
that affect a security’s price), 125  and insider trading (trading based on 
nonpublic information when facing a duty to disclose that information).126 
Activism can potentially fall within any of these three groups. For example, 
activists with an investment stake might want to engage in market 
manipulation by spreading false rumors to raise that security’s price, and 
 
121. For example, the Securities Act’s registration requirements for the offer and sale of securities 
exempts private offerings to accredited investors; consequently, activist investment funds avoid 
registration and disclosure requirements by having exclusively accredited investors. Securities Act of 
1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2018) (Rule 506’s 
accredited investor safe harbor for meeting section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act). The Securities 
Exchange Act requires registration of broker-dealers as well as issuers of more than $10 million of 
securities to more than 2,000 shareholders of record; hedge funds and individual activist investors, 
however, are traditionally not treated as broker-dealers, and they limit their holders of record to fewer 
than 2,000 shareholders of record. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(g), 15(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g), 
78o(b) (2018); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF 
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 18 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS], https://www.sec.gov/files/implications-growth-hedge-funds-0 
9292003.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2M6-MCHV] (distinguishing between “dealers,” which are required to 
register, and “traders,” which are not).  
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018). In addition to section 
10(b)’s antifraud prohibition, section 9 applies to fraud in market manipulation, and section 18 applies 
to fraud in documents with the SEC. Exchange Act §§ 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (2018). Causes of 
action within these two sections are generally subsumed within section 10(b). 
123. Although section 10(b) does not require disclosure, it may indirectly lead to disclosure as a 
means of defeating its deceptive conduct element. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
655 (1997) (“[I]f the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, 
there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation . . . .”). 
124. See, e.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(analyzing securities manipulation claim). 
125. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
126. See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642. 











then sell the stake before the false information is corrected.127  Another 
activist might acquire seats on the board of a company and want to use that 
position to make deceptive statements about that company’s operations, 
engaging in securities fraud to prop up the stock price and the activist’s 
investment returns. Or finally, an activist might acquire private inside 
information about a company and want to use that information to trade 
profitably in that company’s shares.128 Consequences from violating section 
10(b) antifraud prohibitions range from a variety of monetary damages 
measures129 to criminal imprisonment.130 
Beyond these general antifraud prohibitions, we review below the 
regulatory framework that specifically applies to positive activism and 
negative activism.131  
A. Current Regulation of Positive Activism 
Even though much of positive activism may occur through entities 
designed to avoid most federal regulation, positive activism is still subject 
to important regulatory provisions. Several of these are aimed at disclosure. 
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires any entity, 
including positive activist funds and individual investors, to disclose any 
 
127. See, e.g., Jim Cramer’s Guide to Market Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 20, 
2007, 9:22 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/03/20/cramer-market-manipulator/ [https://perma. 
cc/3EHE-MBZH] (describing this practice in the hedge fund industry); Mitts, supra note 63 (analyzing 
anonymous shorters’ manipulation of securities prices).  
128. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Rajaratnam, 
719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013). 
129. Insider trading cases commonly result in disgorgement damages, while other section 10(b) 
violations result in financial damages loosely tied to the impact that the violation had on the securities 
market. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2018) (private securities litigation reform act damage measure 
for private section 10(b) causes of action); SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2014) (disgorgement 
in civil insider trading context); United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2012) (disgorgement 
in criminal insider trading context).  
130. See, e.g., Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139. 
131. We consider here only federal regulation. Although states have adopted “blue sky” laws that 
regulate the offer and sale of securities, and also often regulate investment advisors, federal preemption 
and other exemption typically renders this regulation inapplicable to hedge funds. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS, supra note 121, at 31 (“Because of federal preemption and the 
availability of exemptions from adviser registration, only some states exercise regulatory authority over 
some hedge fund advisers, and most do not regulate the offer and sale of interests in hedge funds.”). In 
addition, depending on activists’ operations, they may find themselves potentially subject to other bodies 
of federal law that we do not consider here, such as ERISA or the Commodities Exchange Act. See 
SCOTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND REGULATION §§ 4:5, 6:13, 7:2 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (considering 
regulations related to these areas). Finally, external legal constraints are not the sole means of shaping 
activist investor behavior. Hedge funds in particular adopt a variety of organizational constraints to align 
investors’ incentives with management’s. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE 
UNCORPORATION 228–31 (2010) (describing the organizational tools used by hedge funds and similar 
entities to achieve this alignment); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory 
Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503 (2017) (analyzing how private companies use these organizational tools 












beneficial ownership interests that exceed 5% of any class of public voting 
shares.132 These disclosures must be made within ten days of acquiring the 
5% position and are publicly available for inspection.133 It also requires 
disclosing the purpose in accumulating a 5% stake, to help regulate the 
market for corporate control of public companies.134 Although section 13(d) 
is not aimed directly at activists, it applies any time activists accumulate a 
sufficiently sizable long position in voting shares, often a precondition of 
engaging in activism. 
Section 13(d) applies to 5% long holdings of publicly traded voting 
equity shares, equity options,135 shares of closed-end investment funds, and 
certain convertible debt securities.136 It therefore covers a wide swath of 
positive activism. Because positive activists seek to increase share prices,137 
they adopt long share positions and equity options, since these are the 
positions that pay off from increased prices.  
Nevertheless, many other instances of positive activism fall outside 
section 13(d)’s disclosure requirement. In particular, holdings under 5% of 
voting shares, holdings of non-public companies, holdings of non-voting 
shares, and holdings of certain financial derivative instruments all fall 
outside section 13(d)’s disclosure obligation, yet all can be used to 
accomplish positive activism.138  
 
132. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018). Section 13(g) contains 
a similar disclosure provision for hedge fund advisors. Exchange Act § 13(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g). 
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1); see, e.g., Fast Answers: Schedule 13D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerssched13htm.html [https://perma.cc/6JKH-TNKW]. 
134. Rule 13d–1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2018); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 
22–25 (1977) (discussing the history of section 13(d)’s attempt to impose disclosure requirements on 
cash tender offers for control); Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial 
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 260 (2009) (noting that the section is 
designed “[t]o regulate the market for control of public companies”). 
135. More precisely, “call” options that are exercisable within sixty days count towards section 
13(d)’s 5% number. “Put” options that provide the right to sell securities, but not acquire them, do not 
count towards the threshold. Neither do call options that cannot be exercised within sixty days. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d-3(d)(1)(i).  
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1); Rule 13(d)-1(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(i) (removing non-voting 
securities from section 13(d)’s purview). 
137. See supra Part I; Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 28 (noting how funds might purchase options, 
rather than shares, to profit from price changes). 
138. Although it is difficult to gauge the extent of this undisclosed activism, because by definition 
it is undisclosed, both anecdotal and systematic empirical evidence suggest it is appreciable in scope. 
See, e.g., Stephan Jank et al., Flying Under the Radar: The Effects of Short-Sale Disclosure Rules on 
Investor Behavior and Stock Prices, 135 J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2020), http://www.fmaconference 
s.org/Norway/Papers/Transparency_short-sales_FMA_subm.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6LG-TNMV] 
(finding investors cluster below investment disclosure thresholds); Jim Rossman, Review of Shareholder 
Activism – 1H 2017, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard. 
edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Lazards-Review-of-Shareholder-Activism-1H-2017.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/T389-EQ5C] (finding three cases of activist campaigns led by activists holding 4.9% of outstanding 
shares in the first half of 2017). 











Section 13(d) is not the sole disclosure provision. Section 13(f) of the 
Exchange Act fills in some of the remaining gaps. Passed to enhance public 
disclosure of institutional investor holdings, the section requires investment 
managers of more than $100 million to file quarterly reports of their 
holdings within forty-five days of the quarter’s close.139 Not all holdings fall 
within section 13(f)’s disclosure requirement; the disclosure requirement 
includes the same securities as section 13(d), without the 5% requirement.140 
Again, this means that many long positions constituting positive activism 
will be disclosed, but activism built on holdings of non-public companies, 
holdings of non-voting shares, or holdings of certain financial derivatives 
need not be reported pursuant to section 13(f). And, of course, section 13(f) 
requirements do not apply to individual investors, or to investment 
managers with under $100 million in assets under management.141 
In addition to disclosure required by sections 13(d) and 13(f) of the 
Exchange Act, investment managers of all types, including hedge funds, 
must register as investment managers with the SEC under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 and make additional periodic required disclosures.142 
These disclosures occur through Forms ADV and PF. Form ADV requires 
investment managers to disclose basic information about management 
strategy, organizational and operational characteristics of the managed 
funds, the size of assets under management, the services that the advisor 
provides, and whether managed funds use certain types of service 
providers.143 Much of this information is then made available to the public, 
although certain sensitive advisor-specific information is disclosed only to 
 
139. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f); Rule 13f-1, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13f-1 (forty-five-day filing window); see generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1063 
(discussing the scope of section 13(f)’s application). In addition, the SEC has raised concerns about 
compliance with section 13(f)’s reporting requirement. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REP. NO. 480, 
REVIEW OF THE SEC’S SECTION 13(F) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, at vi (Sept. 27, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/480.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH24-HZ8E] (finding that no SEC division audits 
section 13(f) filings; the SEC does not systematically use the data disclosed in section 13(f) filings; and 
that section 13(f) filings often contain significant errors or omissions). 
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78m; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(c) (defining 13(f) securities and cross-referencing 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)). 
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f). 
142. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2018). The Act was amended in 
2010 to remove the “private adviser” exemption that hedge funds had traditionally used to avoid 
registration. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (eliminating the exemption); Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1050 n.152 
(noting that hedge funds were “typically exempt from registration” under the private adviser exemption). 
A limited exemption was enacted for investment advisors with under $150 million in assets under 
management. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(m), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m); Dodd-Frank § 408, 
124 Stat. at 1575.  
143. See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry: 












the SEC.144 Detailed information about fund holdings need not be filed 
pursuant to Form ADV. 
Form PF, on the other hand, requires hedge funds and other private 
investment funds with at least $150 million in assets under management to 
submit non-public annual reports about these funds and their trading 
strategies.145 Although the SEC provides summary reports based on Form 
PF data, the underlying data are not themselves publicly available.146 Form 
PF requires managers to disclose the aggregate value of long positions 
across different asset types, although the individual holdings need not be 
identified.147 
Most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act added swap market reporting 
requirements via Regulation SBSR. Activists may use derivative 
instruments to gain disproportionate voting clout relative to their 
shareholdings.148 As a result of Regulation SBSR, the SEC requires that 
certain information about security-based swaps be reported, including 
contractual information about the swaps being traded, the date, time, 
quantity, and price of trades, counterparty identities, information about the 
clearing process, and more.149 Most of this information is reported only to 
the SEC; only limited information about trading prices and the transaction, 
without identifying information about traders, is subject to public disclosure 
requirements.150 
B. Current Regulation of Negative Activism 
Negative activism is, in principle, subject to both the same regulations 
that apply to positive activism as well as certain rules that specifically 
govern negative activism through their regulation of short selling. Among 
these short-specific rules, Regulation SHO 151  prohibits “naked” short 
 
144. Investment Adviser Public Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.adviserinf 
o.sec.gov [https://perma.cc/6SSK-UH35] (providing a searchable database of publicly available portions 
of filed Forms ADV). 
145. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 50 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 243, 269–73 (2013) (discussing the Form PF reporting requirements). 
146. Partnoy, supra note 39, at 104. 
147. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF 12–15, 17–20, https://www.sec.gov/files/formpf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24KC-362Y]. 
148. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund, 654 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2011) (Winter, J., 
concurring) (“The district court’s legal analysis concluded that the one role of such swaps was to avoid 
the disclosure requirements of Section 13(d)—no doubt true . . . .”); Hu & Black, supra note 11, at 823–
46 (discussing strategic use of derivative financial instruments to avoid various regulations). 
149. Regulation SBSR, 17 C.F.R. § 242.901(b) (2018); see generally Security-Based Swaps: 
Recently Adopted and Proposed Rules Under Title VII, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 5–16 (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Security_Based_Swaps_09_10_201
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AXB-SEFW] (summarizing reporting obligations for security-based swaps).  
150. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 149, at 9–10. 
151. Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.200–242.204 (2018).  











selling, in which the short seller sells securities that she does not own or has 
not arranged to borrow. 152  Broker-dealers are also prohibited from 
executing customers’ short sales if a short selling client has failed to deliver 
shares within three days of the sale.153 Problems from naked short selling 
can occur when the short seller is unable to deliver the shorted shares, 
leaving the purchaser unable to vote the shares she thought she purchased 
and leaving the short seller subject to large financial exposure.154 Others 
have raised concerns about naked short selling’s potential to manipulate 
securities downward.155 Because of the concerns, Regulation SHO prohibits 
the practice. 
In addition, section 16 of the Exchange Act prohibits statutory insiders 
from selling shares of their company stock short. 156  Statutory insiders 
include key company executives as well as any holder of a 10% long 
position, conceivably limiting some forms of negative activism.157 
Other rules govern the margins that short sellers must satisfy when 
selling shares short. Short sales are executed on margin—the seller 
effectively borrows shares that she does not yet own—making them subject 
to margin regulations. These regulations require the short seller to post 125% 
to 150% of the short position’s value as collateral, with the short seller 
required to make up any shortfalls that emerge over time.158 Many brokers 
 
152. See Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,972, 62,975–78 (Nov. 
6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242). Regulation SHO is buttressed by special antifraud 
liability for those who misrepresent to broker-dealers that they can deliver shorted shares. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-21; cf. “Naked” Short Selling Antifraud Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 58,774, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 61,666, 61,675 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (noting that Rule 10b-21 
imposes no additional liability beyond that already contained within section 10 and Rule 10b-5). 
153. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60,388, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,266, 
38,269 (July 31, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 242) (enacting Rule 204). 
154. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 11, at 1690. The worry is that without a predetermined ability to 
cover short positions, the shorter may have to pay an extraordinarily high price ultimately to buy them. 
This financial exposure concern, of course, could be addressed by margin or other requirements that do 
not disproportionately restrict certain types of behavior like naked shorting. 
155. See generally id. Some argue that naked short selling also brings market benefits, such as 
higher liquidity and greater pricing efficiency of the shorted securities. Veljko Fotak et al., Fails-to-
Deliver, Short Selling, and Market Quality, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 493, 504 (2014).  
156. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2018). The provision also is 
known for its limits on short-swing profits by requiring disgorgement of profits gained (or losses avoided) 
by purchases followed by sales (or sales followed by purchases) within any six-month period. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78p(a)(2)(C). 
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1). 
158. Regulation T requires short sellers to post collateral equal to 150% of the initial market value 
of the shorted shares. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(a) (2018). Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA), an organization governing the behavior of most brokers and dealers, requires shorts 
to be funded by at least 125% of the shorted amount on an ongoing basis, after the trade has already 
been executed. 4210. Margin Requirements, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/fi 
nra-rules/4210 [https://perma.cc/2Q3S-RRM8]; see also Order Approving FINRA Rule 4210, Exchange 












and dealers used by short sellers set their own margin requirements in excess 
of these minimums.159  
Short sales are also subject to an “alternative uptick rule.” Through 
2007,160 the SEC employed the original “uptick rule,” which imposed no 
restrictions on short selling when prices were rising but which prohibited 
short sales when prices were falling.161 The original uptick rule was replaced 
by the alternative uptick rule in early 2010, which imposes restrictions on 
shorting securities only when prices have declined by at least 10% relative 
to the prior day’s closing price.162 Prohibiting short sales during falling 
markets is meant to slow down price declines and remove incentives to 
manipulate prices downward.163  
Occasionally, short sales are banned in their entirety. During the 
dramatic stock market fall in September 2008, for example, short selling 
was banned in financial firms’ securities.164 
Forms ADV and PF also require investment managers to disclose certain 
information about their activities to the SEC, irrespective of whether those 
activities involve long or short positions. Regulation SBSR, which requires 
disclosure to the SEC (and limited public disclosure) of information related 
to security-based swap transactions, also applies to derivative instruments 
that give negative activists, or others, a net short position.165 
Notably, however, other disclosure obligations for positive activism—
principally sections 13(d), 13(f), and 13(g)—are triggered only by long 
holdings of securities. 166  In other words, negative activists can adopt 
negative positions of any amount, far in excess of sections 13(d) and 13(g)’s 
5% long threshold, without giving rise to disclosure requirements. In other 
 
159. See, e.g., Margin: Borrowing Money to Pay for Stocks, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 
17, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsmarginhtm.html [https:// 
perma.cc/N8QC-T9SH] (stating that “many brokerage firms have higher maintenance requirements” 
than FINRA’s minimum threshold); 9 Frequently Asked Questions About Short Selling, CHARLES 
SCHWAB (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.schwab.com/active-trader/insights/content/9-frequently-asked-
questions-about-short-selling [https://perma.cc/V2EV-9Q4T] (imposing maintenance margin 
requirements ranging from 130% to 200%). 
160. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 59,748, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,042, 
18,042 (Apr. 20, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). The uptick rule had been enacted seventy 
years before, in 1938. Id. at 18,044. 
161. See generally Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick 
Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 803–04 
(1989) (summarizing the uptick rule). 
162. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232, 
11,244 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
163. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 11, at 1690. 
164. Id. at 1694. The last time short selling experienced blanket bans in the United States was in 
1931. Id. 
165. Regulation SBSR, 17 C.F.R. § 242.901(b) (2018); see also supra notes 148–150 and 
accompanying text (discussing Regulation SBSR reporting requirements). 
166. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), (f), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f), (g) (2018). 











parts of the world, such as the European Union, funds are required to 
disclose short positions of 0.5% or more of a firm’s share value,167 but no 
analogue is present in U.S. securities markets. 
C. Rationalizing Negative Versus Positive Activism Regulation  
As the prior discussion shows, positive and negative activism are 
regulated rather differently. Positive activism regulation relies principally 
upon disclosure rules, while negative activism instead adopts rules to 
govern the manner in which short sales occur. The two approaches share the 
similar trait of invariance based on the type of positive or negative activism, 
however.  
Here, we analyze whether these regulatory techniques make sense from 
a policy perspective. Since positive and negative activism involve taking 
long and short positions, respectively, the optimal regulatory techniques for 
each could reasonably differ. Moreover, since the type of activism can also 
vary within each of positive and negative activism, optimal regulation could 
differ even further. We therefore discuss optimal approaches across 
operational, informational, and unintentional negative activism—the 
framework developed in Part II—as comparisons to current policy. 
At first blush, negative activism might appear to present straightforward 
and simple questions. If social welfare is enhanced by maximizing 
shareholder value, then surely activities that reduce shareholder value, and 
negative activism, are socially deleterious. Indeed, short selling is often 
criticized as involving controversial, generally undesirable trading 
practices.168 But a closer examination reveals that negative activists can play 
an important, and indeed helpful, role in financial markets. These costs and 
benefits vary based on the category of negative activism.  
Before we turn to how public policy might address this variation, we 
pause briefly to consider the costs borne by short sellers as a result of the 
current regulatory regime. These costs are important and considerable, and 
typically do not apply to positive activism.  
First, the risk-return profile of a short position differs significantly from 
that of a long position. By selling short, the investor profits only when the 
stock price decreases. Thus, the maximum profit from a short position per 
 
167. Regulation (EU) 236/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 
on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, art. 6, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 1, 11; see also 
Short Selling, EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTHORITY 2, https://www.esma.europa.eu/regulation/trading/short-
selling [https://perma.cc/AV9Q-QJMY]. 
168. See, e.g., Joanna Lee, Recent Development, Activist Short Sellers: Market Manipulators or 
Market Protectors?, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 274, 276–78 (2013); Feng Ye, Note, Trading on the 
Outcomes of Patent Challenges: Short-Selling Petitioners and Possible Modifications to the Inter Partes 












shorted share is the price of the stock (stock price falling to zero), whereas 
the potential loss is infinite (stock price rising indefinitely). Moreover, the 
asset pricing literature suggests that long positions in equity earn a risk 
premium over time.169 The short seller, therefore, starts from behind and 
must overcome the expected market rate of return before expecting a profit 
on the shorted shares.170 In other words, absent some advantage associated 
with a particular short position, short selling is a risky proposition that 
expects to lose money. Positive activists can ride the winds of the market; 
negative activists must fight against them. 
Second, short selling’s margin requirements tie up the short seller’s 
assets as collateral.171 These assets could otherwise be put to other uses. The 
opportunity cost of posting collateral, especially if that collateral is cash, 
adds to the difficulty and expense of short selling as a strategy.  
Third, while short positions are open, short sellers must reimburse the 
stock lender for any dividends or distributions paid to the shareholder of the 
shorted stock, representing a real cost to the short seller. 172  Moreover, 
depending on the requirements of particular brokers, short sellers can be 
required to pay an additional “special” premium for shares that are difficult 
to borrow. 
 
169. For example, one recent survey suggests that the equity risk premiums are in the range of 4%, 
meaning that the return on a diversified index of stocks was expected to outperform risk-free yields by 
approximately 4%. See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Equity Risk Premium in 2018 (Apr. 
2, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3151162 [https://perma.cc/EBF9-UFB2] 
(reporting an average equity risk premium of 4.42%). The average short position, then, is expected to 
cost the short seller the equity premium plus the risk-free rate, or approximately the market rate of return, 
over time. See, e.g., Bill Barker, How Have Stocks Fared the Past 50 Years? You’ll Be Surprised., 
MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 22, 2016, 9:07 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/04/22/how-hav 
e-stocks-fared-the-last-50-years-youll-be-s.aspx [https://perma.cc/2PTY-NNML]; see generally PK, 
S&P 500 Return Calculator, with Dividend Reinvestment, DON’T QUIT YOUR DAY JOB (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://dqydj.com/sp-500-return-calculator/ [https://perma.cc/F6VG-C4RD] (allowing for calculation of 
average annualized S&P 500 returns over various periods of time, and showing historical nominal stock 
market returns of approximately 9%). 
170. However, by shorting shares, the short seller typically gains some funds that she could invest 
in a market basket of securities to earn the market rate of return, although this offset will be limited by 
the degree and type of collateral (such as cash) that the activist uses to satisfy margin requirements as 
well as any particular margin agreement terms, both initially and over time. 
171. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(a) (2018); see also supra notes 158–159 and accompanying 
text. 
172. See, e.g., Dan Caplinger, Dividends Paid on Short Sales, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:00 
PM), https://www.fool.com/taxes/2015/01/15/dividends-paid-on-short-sales.aspx [https://perma.cc/MA 
P4-CR5S]. This situation can lead to short squeezes from creative uses of dividends, as when Overstock 
announced a special dividend of “Digital Voting Series A-1 Preferred Stock” that would trade only on 
Overstock’s proprietary platform. Matt Levine, Overstock Has Had a Wild Week, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 
19, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-19/overstock-has-had-a-w 
ild-week [https://perma.cc/8WR4-473S]. 











Fourth, short sellers are required to repay the stock loan on demand, 
exposing them to the risk of a short squeeze.173 If a short seller is unable to 
find an alternative lender, then the short seller must purchase the shares on 
the open market to repay the loan, effectively closing the position 
prematurely at whatever current market prices happen to be. 
Fifth, public short sellers risk invoking the ire of regulators and private 
companies when engaging in short selling. As mentioned earlier, public 
disclosures of short interests have brought allegations of criminal conduct, 
investigations by public and private parties, and the threat of legal action.174 
Taking long positions and attempting to raise stock prices typically, absent 
fraud, does not invoke these responses, particularly from the target of those 
long positions, again making shorting disproportionately costly. 
Finally, the tax treatment of gains from short selling is less favorable 
than gains on long positions. Long positions that are held for more than one 
year are eligible for favorable long-term capital gain tax rates, which are 
less than ordinary income tax rates.175 The tax treatment for call options, 
which can be used for positive activism,176 follows a similar rule, where the 
holding period is measured from the date that the option is exercised.177 In 
comparison, any profits from short positions are taxed at higher short-term 
ordinary income rates, regardless of the period for which the activist 
maintained the short position.178 
 
173. See, e.g., Key Points About Regulation SHO, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 8, 2015), htt 
ps://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/regsho.htm [https://perma.cc/4MT4-LBU2]. 
174. Appel & Fos, supra note 66; Lamont, supra note 55; Stefan Nagel, Short Sales, Institutional 
Investors and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 277, 281–82 (2005) (noting the 
indirect constraints to institutional short selling). 
175. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2018) (tax rates); 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2018) (defining long-term capital 
gain).  
176. See, e.g., supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing Bill Ackman’s use of call 
options in his attempted positive activism at Target). 
177. Dep’t of the Treasury, I.R.S. Pub. 550, Investment Income and Expenses (Including Capital 
Gains and Losses) 58 (Mar. 28, 2019) [hereinafter I.R.S. Pub. 550], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55 
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY3H-JAQY] (“Any gain or loss on the sale of the underlying stock is long term 
or short term depending on your holding period for the underlying stock.”). Selling the call option before 
exercising it is taxed based on the length of time for which the call option was held. See, e.g., Robert A. 
Green, Assessing the Tax Treatment of Options Trading, FORBES (May 29, 2015, 3:50 PM), https://www. 
forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/05/29/assessing-the-tax-treatment-of-options-trading/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3WEB-Q5BA]. 
178. I.R.S. Pub. 550, supra note 177, at 55 (“As a general rule, you determine whether you have 
short-term or long-term capital gain or loss on a short sale by the amount of time you actually hold the 
property eventually delivered to the lender to close the short sale.”). Thus, the negative activist could 
achieve long-term capital gains on a short position only if she held the underlying asset for at least twelve 
months before the short position closed (a “covered” short). Activists who short securities without 
holding the underlying shares, or who have held the underlying shares for fewer than twelve months 












In sum, short sellers face significant costs and barriers.179 In our view, 
the assessment of these costs and barriers when short sellers are engaging 
in negative activism depends on the type of negative activism. We now turn 
to a policy analysis that assesses negative activism in light of these 
comparative costs. We generally see informational negative activism as 
normatively desirable, presenting little need for additional regulation; 
operational negative activism as normatively undesirable, in need of 
additional regulation; and unintentional negative activism as normatively 
neutral with no need for additional regulation. 
1. Informational Negative Activism  
Informational activism seeks to profit from share price movements after 
the activist releases new information into the marketplace. Typically we 
associate this behavior with activists’ promulgating good information about 
a company; informational negative activism, however, decreases stock 
prices by revealing bad information about a company. 
We begin our analysis with the widely-accepted view among finance 
researchers that revealing negative truthful information is socially valuable 
and that the skewed incentive structure naturally encourages the discovery 
and release of positive information, but discourages the discovery and 
release of negative information. We then analyze the regulatory approach to 
informational negative activism and suggest reforms. 
Regardless of whether the information is positive or negative in nature, 
scholars typically view new accurate information about securities as a good 
thing.180 When more information is available in the marketplace, securities 
prices are better indicators of fundamental company values, and price 
discovery is enhanced. 181  Accurate securities prices are instrumental in 
making sure that limited funds are put towards their most valued uses. Firms 
whose shares are inaccurately overvalued attract too much capital relative 
to their economic contributions; firms whose shares are inaccurately 
 
179. To some extent, it is possible to use derivatives, including swaps and options, to avoid some 
of these costs, although derivatives also pose unique challenges of their own. 
180. See generally Merritt B. Fox & Kevin S. Haeberle, Evaluating Stock-Trading Practices and 
Their Regulation, 42 J. CORP. L. 887, 897–903 (2017) (reviewing the economic benefits from accurate 
securities prices); Peter Molk, Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility, 51 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 2129, 2172 (2018) (using the mispricing of investment interests as an argument in favor of 
changing LLC governance law). 
181. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 269–77 (2014) 
(reaffirming courts’ presumption of the efficient capital markets hypothesis when securities markets 
meet certain requirements); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988) (assuming that 
“market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, 
thereby affecting stock market prices”); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 415 (1970) (describing the semi-strong efficient capital markets 
hypothesis, which presumes that securities prices reflect all publicly available information). 











undervalued attract too little.182 To ensure capital is efficiently deployed, 
securities prices should reflect the fundamental value of their respective 
enterprises, which relies on information entering the securities markets. 
Importantly, both positive and negative information must enter the 
securities markets for prices to be accurate. If only positive information 
were reflected in prices, the worry is that securities would be systematically 
overpriced. Investors might add a market-wide “unrevealed negative 
information” discount, but then some securities would be more overpriced 
than others, depending on their underlying firms’ relative ratios of 
unrevealed negative information to public positive information. This 
mispricing leads to misallocation of capital, which securities market 
regulators actively seek to avoid.183 
Therefore, informational negative activism is desirable simply to the 
extent it introduces new information about securities into securities markets. 
But even the threat of discovering and disclosing negative information can 
be valuable. The disciplining hypothesis set forth by Massa, Zhang, and 
Zhang states that as short sellers increase price information and attack the 
misconduct of firms, their presence, by increasing the probability and speed 
with which the market uncovers earnings management, reduces managers’ 
incentives to manipulate earnings. 184  Consistent with the disciplining 
hypothesis, Fang, Huang, and Karpoff find evidence that short selling, or its 
prospect, reduces firms’ manipulation of earnings numbers, helps detect 
fraud, and improves asset pricing efficiency. 185  The mere potential for 
uncovering and disclosing negative information can therefore align manager 
and shareholder interests. 
Uncovering and disclosing negative information is therefore valuable, 
but the need is even greater once we consider companies’ disparate 
incentives for voluntary disclosure of positive but not negative information. 
Positive news boosts share prices. Increasing one’s share price not only 
makes raising future capital easier,186 but also makes management of those 
companies look like they are successful at their stewardship. A higher share 
price also means that any management performance-based compensation is 
 
182. See, e.g., Fox & Haeberle, supra note 180, at 895–904. 
183. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018) (directing the SEC to assess whether “action[s] will 
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2018) (same). 
184. See Massimo Massa, Bohui Zhang & Hong Zhang, The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does 
Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 1701 (2015). 
185. See generally Vivian W. Fang, Allen H. Huang & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Short Selling and 
Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment, 71 J. FIN. 1251 (2016). 
186. Higher share prices in secondary markets mean the company can raise relatively more funds 












higher, 187  making these individuals financially better off by releasing 
positive news. 
On the other hand, companies have little financial incentive to release 
negative information voluntarily. In fact, companies have reason to devote 
efforts to prevent or obfuscate this information from the public. To the 
extent negative information reduces share prices, the same forces that act to 
encourage management to release positive information encourage them to 
keep the negative information under wraps.188 Of course, companies’ ability 
to hide negative information is limited in some respects. Periodic disclosure 
rules require public companies to release information that falls within 
enumerated categories, whether that information is positive, negative, or 
neutral.189 Antifraud rules also prohibit companies from releasing false or 
misleading information when those companies choose to communicate 
voluntarily.190 But the resulting downward pressure on share prices from 
releasing negative information means that management has little reason to 
go beyond required disclosures.  
If having negative information (or the threat of discovering negative 
information) in the marketplace is valuable, 191  yet companies lack the 
 
187. Alex Edmans et al., Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence 152 fig.6 
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 6585, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302 
3787 [https://perma.cc/5M2V-AHAA] (showing widespread use of performance-based pay among 
company management). Even when management’s compensation is not directly tied to firm performance, 
management may voluntarily hold shares in their managed firms, giving them the same incentive to 
increase share prices. 
188. See S. P. Kothari et al., Do Managers Withhold Bad News?, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 241 (2009); 
Roni Michaely et al., Further Evidence on the Strategic Timing of Earnings News: Joint Analysis of 
Weekdays and Times of Day, 62 J. ACCT. & ECON. 24 (2016). 
189. Filing requirements can be found in Section 13 of the Exchange Act, which applies to 
companies that are listed on national securities exchanges, large companies with a large number of 
shareholders, and companies that have made a public offering of their securities under the Securities Act 
of 1933. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018) (periodic filing 
requirements); Exchange Act § 12(a), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a), (g) (listed on a national securities exchange, 
or large); Exchange Act § 15(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78o(d)(1) (public offering). Even if negative information 
falls within a required disclosure category, the negative repercussions from disclosing this information 
suggest the company will delay disclosing this information until required. Positive information, on the 
other hand, might be expected to be disclosed fairly quickly, because of its positive effect on stock prices. 
See, e.g., Kristoffel R. Grechenig, Positive and Negative Information – Insider Trading Rethought 10 
(Univ. of St. Gallen Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2007-28, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap 
ers.cf m?abstract_id=1019425 [https://perma.cc/XRB7-6DCQ].  
190. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (general antifraud provision); 
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (banning fraudulent statements or omissions of 
information that would be required to render statements not misleading); Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 
15 U.S.C. § 77j (providing private cause of action for fraud in a registration statement); Securities Act 
of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (civil liability for fraud in a prospectus). 
191. Cf. Mitts & Talley, supra note 90 (asserting that disclosing cybersecurity vulnerabilities can 
be undesirable, to the extent that it causes others to tap into these vulnerabilities and expose sensitive 
information). As a more general matter, we might be concerned to the extent that revealing negative 
information gives rise to negative operational changes by another. One would hope, of course, that the 
 











incentive to release this information unless required, then another way for 
this information to become available is through private efforts to discover 
and release it. Insider trading restrictions keep company insiders from 
disclosing this information for personal gain, 192  and the SEC’s private 
whistleblower program has been met with only modest success so far,193 so 
another route must be found for this information to enter the marketplace 
via private means. Enter informational negative activism. Activists typically 
face no insider trading restrictions to prevent them from profiting by 
revealing negative information about a company. As long as the activist is 
not a statutory insider (an executive of the company or a holder of at least 
10% of the company’s shares)194 and as long as the activist does not inherit 
fiduciary duties of trust and confidence from the information’s source 
(which is unlikely to happen in many circumstances),195 the activist is free 
 
increased prospect of negative disclosures would encourage firms to prevent against these vulnerabilities 
and quickly manage them when exposed. These preventative steps, however, impose costs of their own, 
although they may also bring collateral benefits, to the extent they deter additional undesirable behavior. 
For example, the firm that locks sensitive documents in the safe to deter information breaches also deters 
garden-variety burglars. Cf. id. (discussing the costs of prevention); Darius Lakdawalla & Eric Talley, 
Optimal Liability for Terrorism (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12578, 2006), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12578 [https://perma.cc/TFZ6-Y46S] (discussing the costs of prevention). 
192. Liberalizing insider trading restrictions for negative information would be one method of 
encouraging dissemination of negative information. See, e.g., Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading 
in Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 199, 231–32 (2009) (applying this argument 
to insider trading by Congressional representatives); Grechenig, supra note 189, at 9–10; Peter Molk, 
Uncorporate Insider Trading, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (applying this argument to 
unincorporated entities); see generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 
59–62 (1966) (describing how insider purchases can transfer information to public markets).  
193. See, e.g., Mengqi Sun, SEC Whistleblower Program Has Record-Breaking Year, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 16, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-whistleblower-program-has-record-brea 
king-year-1542413518 [https://perma.cc/XQT2-2D4Y] (noting that the SEC paid out a record amount 
of whistleblower rewards in fiscal year 2018, although awards were paid to only thirteen individuals, 
comprising fewer than ten targets). 
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2018). 
195. For the activist to inherit a prohibition against trading based on material nonpublic 
information, the information’s original source must possess such a duty, that source must pass the 
information for personal gain, and the activist must be aware that the original source is passing the 
information for gain. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). When information reaches the activist 
through a remote tipping chain, the probability that the activist will be aware of anything regarding the 
information’s original source grows small, eliminating liability for insider trading. See, e.g., Salman v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.1 (2016) (declining to rule on this issue); United States v. Newman, 
773 F.3d 438, 453–54 (2d Cir. 2014). Moreover, if the original source does not breach a fiduciary duty 
in passing the information, the activist faces no trading restrictions. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665 (requiring 
the breach of a fiduciary duty for traders to be liable). Finally, if the activist learns of the information 
independently, the activist faces no insider trading restrictions, which generally do not attach to 
“outsiders” who acquire and trade on material nonpublic information. See John Reed Stark, Guest Post, 
Think the SEC EDGAR Data Breach Involved Insider Trading? Think Again., D&O DIARY (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/10/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-think-sec-edgar-data-br 
each-involved-insider-trading-think/ [https://perma.cc/BZ9C-UBLY] (describing SEC attempts to 












to profit from selling short a company stock and then revealing the negative 
information.196  
As we noted at the start of this section, short sellers face substantial 
additional difficulties and costs unique to taking a short position; these 
difficulties and costs deter informational negative activism. 197  Profiting 
from price decreases is systematically more difficult and riskier than 
profiting from price increases, given stock markets’ expected increases over 
time, and short sellers must shoulder the other financial and regulatory 
burdens unique to short selling. These disproportionate costs make the 
returns from investing in negative information discovery comparatively low, 
discouraging investment in its discovery and dissemination.  
For all these reasons, the policy argument in favor of encouraging 
informational negative activism is a strong one. Informational negative 
activism is not only valuable, but also arguably more valuable than 
informational positive activism. The reason is straightforward: firms that 
seek to maximize their share prices have a disincentive to disclose negative 
information, thus skewing the pool of information. Thus, private incentives 
alone will encourage the production of positive information more than 
negative information. To the extent policymakers want to encourage the 
dissemination of information associated with informational negative 
activism, regulation arguably should not impose excessive costs that would 
deter this kind of activism; indeed, they might even consider subsidizing it. 
How does current regulatory policy address these challenges? In many 
cases, fairly well. 
First, informational activism of all types is in some ways lightly 
regulated, which makes informational activism a comparatively attractive 
form of activism. One potentially significant regulatory barrier, insider 
trading restrictions, is easily overcome as long as the trader makes sure she 
has not inherited disclosure duties from the information’s original source. 
Most of the other substantive regulation focuses on disclosure obligations. 
Although disclosure makes it more difficult for traders to acquire shares 
privately over an extended time period, this should be unproblematic for 
informational activists, who seek to profit from a relatively quick movement 
in price following revelation of their information; indeed, the time between 
entry and exit from a position might be entirely accomplished before the 
disclosure window comes due. By contrast, the operational activist, who 
might devote considerable effort to achieving operational reform (and price 
 
196. Indeed, the SEC recognizes the value that comes from private shorting of stocks. Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Short Selling Restrictions (Feb. 24, 2010), https://w 
ww.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-26.htm [https://perma.cc/3YGL-6NKR] (“Short selling can serve 
useful market purposes, including providing market liquidity and pricing efficiency.”). 
197. See supra notes 169–178 and accompanying text. 











movements) over an extended period, suffers a far greater burden from 
being required to disclose her holdings and intentions early in the process. 
In addition to imposing a comparatively light regulatory burden on 
informational activism, some activist regulation also appears to favor 
informational negative activism over informational positive activism. Given 
the greater need for private disclosure of negative information, 198  this 
balance seems appropriate. The disclosure obligation is fairly manageable 
for positive informational activism, but it is nonexistent for most 
informational negative activism. 199  Lowering the regulatory burden to 
informational negative activism, even if only modestly,200 not only reduces 
its costs, but also makes it easier for the activist to amass a greater position 
that increases her eventual payoff. Even though activism policy may not 
have been set up with this implicit comparative subsidy for negative 
activism in mind, its existence is nevertheless an attractive feature of the 
current regime.201 
On the other hand, other regulatory aspects—the alternative uptick rule, 
Regulation SHO, and tax policy—disadvantage informational negative 
activism relative to positive activism. Some of these relative costs are only 
slight, and so are perhaps not overly troubling. For instance, negative-
activism-specific restrictions from the alternative uptick rule and Regulation 
SHO likely will not apply to informational negative activism. Informational 
activism does not typically follow dramatic stock declines, making the 
alternative uptick rule non-binding202 and making it comparatively easy to 
line up covered shorts to comply with Regulation SHO.203 In addition, tax 
rules penalize short positions and negative activism relative to long 
positions and positive activism, but only when the long position is held for 
 
198. See discussion accompanying supra notes 183–196 and accompanying text. 
199. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), (f), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f), (g) (2018); 
see also supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
200. Given the short duration of most informational activists’ holdings, the disclosure regimes 
may provide little burden for either positive or informational negative activism, since the disclosure 
obligation might not be triggered until the activist has already exited her position. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m(d)(1) (2018); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that disclosure is required 
within ten days after acquiring a 5% voting share stake). 
201. Notably, this analysis supports continuing the asymmetric disclosure regimes that require 
13D and 13F disclosures for long positions, but not short positions. Although some have pushed for 
mandatory public disclosure of short positions, a system tilted in favor of informational negative 
activism over positive activism may strike the appropriate balance, given the comparative value of 
disclosing new negative information over positive information. See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 11, at 
875–86; Massa, supra note 54 (arguing for disclosure).  
202. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232, 
11,244 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); see also supra note 162 and accompanying 
text. 













a year or longer.204 Given informational activism’s short holding periods for 
both positive and negative information, it is likely that the tax treatment will 
be the same short-term capital gains rate for both positive and negative 
activism.205  
Finally, some regulations unquestionably disadvantage informational 
negative activism. Firms’ ability to employ leverage to short shares is 
limited by government regulation, 206  making informational negative 
activism comparatively costly. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny have 
pointed to this cost as potentially limiting arbitrage possibilities in stock 
markets, inefficiently impeding share prices’ movement from reflecting 
fundamental values.207 These regulations may be desirable for other reasons, 
but their presence further reinforces the need to advantage informational 
negative activism. 
Given the potential for informational negative activism to improve 
market efficiency, policymakers should at least consider efforts to reduce 
the difficulties and costs associated with short selling. To the extent there 
are future calls for imposing costs on short sellers, regulators should 
presumptively resist such calls. Since the evidence supports subsidizing this 
form of activism, not restricting it, a compelling case must be made to 
overcome that presumption.  
Indeed, regulators might consider implementing new rules designed to 
subsidize informational negative activism. For example, long-term capital 
gains taxes from short selling might be substantially reduced, perhaps to 
zero. Regulators might encourage reforms related to the disparate riskiness 
and cost of short selling, including reforms related to share lending. 
Regulation of large institutional investors might be relaxed, to permit or 
encourage these institutions to invest and engage in informational negative 
activism, or at least to allocate greater resources to such activists. 208 
Securities regulators might create safe harbors for short sellers, to protect 
them from litigation or enforcement actions as long as they do not take 
specified deleterious, manipulative actions. Our bottom-line normative 
conclusion is straightforward: non-manipulative informational negative 
activism should be encouraged.  
 
204. See I.R.S. Pub. 550, supra note 177; see also supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
205. Tax rules could be changed to provide a means of subsidizing negative versus positive 
informational activism, but we do not consider the details of that potential change here. 
206. See supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text. 
207. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 49–50, 50 n.6 
(1997). 
208. Molk & Partnoy, supra note 44. 











2. Operational Negative Activism  
Our recommendation is very different for operational negative activism. 
Consider the contrasts between operational negative activism and 
operational positive activism. Recall that in positive operational activism, 
activists work to change a company’s operations to move asset prices in 
their desired direction. Whereas positive activists act to increase the value 
of companies, negative activists try to destroy it. This characteristic leads to 
a sharp separation between the desirability of positive and negative 
operational activism.  
A case can be made that positive operational activism justifies a 
regulatory subsidy. It enhances the fundamental value of companies and the 
economy as a whole, as evidenced by share price returns after activist 
interventions.209 While the private financial returns from positive activism 
already incentivize this desirable activity, from a policy perspective these 
rewards arguably are suboptimally low. Positive activists can bear 
significant expenses to achieve positive change, which are not always 
reimbursed,210 but they typically capture only a portion of the improvements 
they generate.211 This is because the positive activist, like any investor, has 
only a partial ownership stake in a targeted company; consequently, much 
of the benefit they generate can be viewed as a positive externality.212 Carl 
 
209. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting a 7% average abnormal share response to 
positive activist interventions). As discussed above, however, not all agree that operational positive 
activism improves companies over the long term. See, e.g., supra note 42; Coffee, supra note 42 (noting 
the often divergent goals between activists and other shareholders). 
210. For instance, activists’ costs to replace incumbent management through a proxy contest are 
generally reimbursed only if the activist wins. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 
128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (formulating the typical rule that failed insurgents’ proxy contest 
expenses are not reimbursable by the company); RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, 
ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 21.01 fig.21-1 (3d ed. 1998) 
(reporting several insurgent proxy contest expenses that averaged approximately $1.8 million in the 
1980s); Carl Icahn, Opinion, We’re Not the Boss of A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2009), https://www.nyt 
imes.com/2009/03/29/opinion/29Icahn.html [https://perma.cc/7VKK-UHG2] (noting that proxy 
contests at large public companies “can run into the millions of dollars”). Shareholders’ attempts to 
change this reimbursement rule have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension 
Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (allowing board to exclude a shareholder proposal that would have 
amended the company bylaws to require reimbursing any proxy contest that was successful in electing 
at least one new director). Less drastic interventions than waging proxy contests, such as lobbying 
existing management to change without replacing that management, can also involve financial expenses 
as well as a significant investment of the activist’s time that goes uncompensated. 
211. In an important recent working paper, John Coffee raises the concern that activists often settle 
with firms for private benefits unavailable to other shareholders, which may mitigate these costs. Coffee, 
supra note 42, at 9–15. 
212. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: 
Ex Ante Control Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction Review (Columbia Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 430, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129502 [https://perma.cc/ 













Icahn, for example, spent considerable effort lobbying Apple to change its 
corporate financial structure in 2013. At the time, he owned only 0.9% of 
the company’s outstanding shares, meaning 99.1% of the gains generated 
by his positive activism would have accrued to other owners.213 Therefore, 
unless the expected benefits to Apple as a whole were at least one hundred 
times Icahn’s expected uncompensated cost in obtaining them, we would 
not expect him to engage in positive activism. 
Of course, the positive externalities problem is not unique to activism. In 
other contexts, legal systems already manage it in various ways. Even in the 
corporate sphere, the problem also arises elsewhere, such as in convincing 
individual shareholders to engage in company management or exercise 
control powers.214 The typical policy response to positive externalities is to 
subsidize the activity. 
Some current regulation already incentivizes positive operational 
activism relative to other activities. As noted above, tax policy creates 
incentives for activists to hold positions for more than one year, and in fact 
studies show positive activist median holding periods exceed one year.215 
Disclosure requirements associated with positive operational activism also 
carry minimal cost.216 Moreover, private ordering solutions can encourage 
activism.217  
The arguments that positive operational activism is beneficial usually do 
not apply to operational negative activism. Operational negative activism 
typically imposes negative externalities on investors and society, harming 
companies’ efficiency and profitability solely for the activist’s individual 
profits. Because of these negative externalities, operational negative 
activists’ incentives are not aligned with those of shareholders or the public. 
 
who reap only a portion of their positive changes). Activists can increase the comparative magnitude of 
these gains through leverage or buying call options or other similar financial derivatives. Leverage 
amounts, however, are limited by Regulation T and by brokers and dealers. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 220.12(a) (2018); see also supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text. Call options include 
transaction costs and practical volume limitations that limit their usefulness. See generally 12 C.F.R. 
§ 220.122(d) (noting exchange and endorsing firm margin requirements that act to limit the volume of 
options that are written); Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (developing a model to determine option prices).  
213. Pat Regnier, Here’s Why Carl Icahn Wants Apple to Buy Back Shares, MONEY (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://time.com/money/3484599/icahn-letter-apple-cash/ [https://perma.cc/N724-CQD8]. 
214. Some have argued that this situation justifies tolerating limited private tunneling of benefits 
by controlling shareholders. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 212. 
215. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Returns, supra note 37, at 49.  
216. As a practical matter, we also doubt whether reducing disclosure requirements would provide 
much subsidy in this area. Operational activists often publicize their ideas to other shareholders to gain 
traction for their suggested intervention, effectively disclosing their positions in the process. See, e.g., 
supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing Carl Icahn’s operational activism, which he 
publicized despite not having an ownership stake that had to be disclosed). 
217. But see CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (allowing 
exclusion of shareholder proposal designed to encourage activism).  











However, the current regulatory framework does not directly deter 
operational negative activism. Moreover, other regulations that potentially 
affect negative activism do not apply to operational negative activism, 
raising the worry that operational negative activism is insufficiently 
deterred.  
Consider, for example, the alternative uptick rule, which prohibits 
shorting securities whose prices have fallen by at least 10% relative to the 
prior trading day’s closing price.218 This rule does little to deter operational 
negative activism. The quintessential operational negative activist shorts 
shares before the price begins to fall, later causing the decline through 
imposing operational changes.219 While the alternative uptick rule might 
limit the activist’s ability to add to her position once the operational changes 
have begun to take effect, this limitation does not impact earlier profits. 
Likewise, securities antifraud provisions do little to deter many instances 
of operational negative activism. Traditional insider trading restrictions 
would not apply to operational negative activism, since they apply when the 
activist faces a duty to disclose her informational advantage.220 This duty 
typically arises when the trader breaches a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship with the information’s source or the trading partner. 221 
Negative activists, however, generally owe no such duty. They trade on their 
own information about their operational plans, rather than information 
acquired confidentially from the company;222 and they own short rather than 
long positions in the company, keeping them from being treated as statutory 
insiders with disclosure duties.223  
Prohibitions against market manipulation also typically would not apply 
to operational negative activism. Claims of market manipulation require 
some type of manipulative activity, which “refers generally to practices, 
such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to 
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”224 A negative 
activist who spreads false information about her activities might be liable 
for market manipulation,225 but an honest negative activist who did not 
 
218. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232, 
11,244 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); see also supra note 162 and accompanying 
text. 
219. See supra Part II.B.2. 
220. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). 
221. Id. 
222. See supra Part II.B.2 (examples of operational negative activism); cf. Mitts & Talley, supra 
note 90, at 26–31 (analyzing whether shorting based on cybersecurity breaches could fit within existing 
insider trading restrictions). 
223. See supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text. 
224. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977); see also Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns 
& Co., 716 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting the manipulative act requirement for manipulation claims). 
225. See, e.g., Mitts, supra note 63, at 38–41 (noting some of the difficulties that can arise in 












mischaracterize any activities, or who just refused to speak, would 
seemingly avoid this prohibition. Shorting alone does not constitute market 
manipulation.226 
Finally, although statutory insiders are directly prohibited from shorting 
shares of company’s stock,227 this prohibition does little to deter operational 
negative activism. To be a statutory insider, the operational negative activist 
would need either to be a key executive of the company or to hold a 10% 
long position in the company’s stock.228 But operational negative activists 
typically have no formal employment position within a targeted 
company,229 and they seek to profit from short positions, not long positions. 
Given that existing restraints do little to deter operational negative 
activism, and given the negative externalities that usually follow this type 
of activism, we see a need for more regulation. To be sure, the burden of 
bearing the costs of conducting operational negative activism will already 
provide some deterrent, but situations where the negative activist’s potential 
gains exceed her cost must also be dissuaded. The need for serious 
regulatory prohibitions, including a meaningful threat of ex post 
enforcement, is particularly warranted given the comparatively limited 
ability of company management to respond, especially when (as with most 
of the examples discussed in Part II.B.2) the activist can achieve her goals 
without management’s involvement. Management is limited in its ability to 
deter negative activism, since standard techniques that devalue the activist’s 
holdings, like poison pills, don’t deter investors with short positions.230 
Companies potentially could implement negative poison pill “vitamin pills,” 
which would dilute a short seller’s interest above a particular percentage 
threshold upon a triggering event, but it is unclear how such devices could 
be operationalized, and whether the courts would uphold them.231 
 
226. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In essence, 
taking a short position is no different than taking a long position. To be actionable as a manipulative act, 
short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market 
participants value a security.”). 
227. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2018); see also supra notes 
156–157 and accompanying text. 
228. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2018). 
229. For example, Bill Ackman pushed for operational changes at Procter & Gamble despite 
holding only a 1% ownership stake in the company and no executive position. Chris Isidore, Ackman 
Wins, P&G Dumps CEO, CNNMONEY (May 24, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/n 
ews/companies/pg-ceo-ackman/index.html [https://perma.cc/3XKM-JBHB]. 
230. Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase Rights Plan (Mar. 
1994), in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 741 (Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. 
Black eds., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing standard poison pill characteristics).  
231. An effective response would need to increase the value of company stock, so that share prices 
increase and reduce the value of the negative activist’s short position. Other than through financial 
manipulations that may be ineffective in an efficient capital market, we presume that management is 
already implementing all value-enhancing plans, as is their job. In that case, the analogue of a poison 
 











If operational negative activism is to be deterred but informational 
negative activism is to be encouraged, the ability to categorize negative 
activism grows particularly important. There are likely to be “mixed” cases 
of informational and operational activism. Although operational and 
informational activism are distinct categories—operational activism seeks 
to impact a firm’s fundamental value, while informational seeks to impact 
the public reflection of a firm’s fundamental value—the lines between the 
two can blur.  
For instance, consider the informational negative activist who discloses 
a firm’s cyber vulnerability, which leads others to disrupt the firm’s 
operations and impose negative operational changes. On one hand, 
disclosure of new, accurate negative information is desirable, since it causes 
securities prices to be better representations of the underlying asset’s 
value.232 On the other hand, if that information obviously causes negative 
operational changes that would not otherwise have occurred, the costs of 
those negative changes could more than outweigh the value of the initial 
information.233 
It would be undesirable for the negative activist to escape consequences 
of operational negative activism merely by disclosing information and then 
allowing another to do the operational work. A regulatory framework would 
therefore need to attribute operational changes to the informational activist 
when those operational changes would naturally follow from the 
information disclosure. Current activist policy fails to do so, but this 
predictive link occurs in other areas of financial regulation, and we think it 
could be implemented here. Regulation FD, for example, prohibits 
disclosures by an issuer to holders of that issuer’s securities if it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the holder would purchase or sell the issuer’s 
securities based on that information.234 A similar exercise could attribute 
later operational changes to an informational activist if it would be 
reasonably foreseeable that revealing the information would give rise to the 
negative operational changes. Then, to the extent operational negative 
activism is penalized, those penalties could be applied to deter the 
informational negative activist who publicly discloses information that 
 
pill would have to make shareholders overpay for new shares at a premium to market prices, to increase 
share prices. We suspect few shareholders would jump at that offer. 
232. See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text. 
233. But if the information disclosure merely hastens negative operation changes that would 
happen anyway, our concerns are less, particularly if earlier implementation of those changes would 
impose lower costs, such as with the breach that happens early, before more sensitive data are assembled 
and lost. 
234. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2018); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 












likely has negative social value.235 In turn, desirable informational activism 
that is not likely to lead to negative operational changes, such as disclosing 
financial fraud, would not be penalized.  
In designing a rule that penalizes operational negative activism, we have 
assumed that operational negative activism is harmful to society. This 
assumption will not always hold, in which case penalizing operational 
negative activism means we would lose out on some beneficial cases. 
Sometimes operational negative activism dismantles illegitimate sources of 
company value, and penalties unfortunately deter those activities. Kyle 
Bass’s challenges to what were potentially illegitimate company patents, for 
example, would be dissuaded under a system that penalized all operational 
negative activism,236 even though challenging invalid patents could be a 
socially desirable way of policing these patents.237 But given operational 
negative activism’s potential for abuse, deterring some beneficial activism 
along with deterring harmful activism could be a favorable regulatory 
tradeoff. Of course, if we could accurately distinguish ex ante between 
socially desirable and undesirable operational negative activism, then we 
should carve the good cases out from the prohibition. 
3. Unintentional Negative Activism  
Finally, we turn briefly to an assessment of optimal regulatory policy for 
unintentional negative activism. Recall that this category of activist acquires 
shares with the hope that she will improve company value but, upon 
disclosing her position, share prices instead decline. Unintentional negative 
activism has few redeeming qualities. 238  As with operational negative 
activism, the unintentional negative activist is not expected to benefit either 
the targeted company or society overall.239 
 
235. Of course, nothing would prevent the activist from disclosing the information to the company 
privately, or for the company to compensate the activist for doing so. In this scenario, the company gets 
the first opportunity to address the problem without its necessarily giving rise to negative operational 
changes. We view this as a desirable outcome. 
236. See supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text. 
237. The Patent & Trademark Office is widely believed to issue excessive bad patents, making 
this form of private policing potentially important. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, 
Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 977 (2019). But if Bass’s mixed success 
is representative of operational negative activism’s potential, even his challenges might have done more 
harm than good, given that the challenges were successful only approximately one-quarter of the time. 
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  
238. At least the activist could say that he or she tried. 
239. It is therefore important to distinguish this activist from the activist who is expected to 
improve company value but unluckily proves unsuccessful down the road. We envision this latter activist 
as producing a positive (or at least neutral) stock price reaction upon disclosing her position, suggesting 
that market actors expect her to add value on average. 











Fortunately, private market forces may already provide an adequate 
deterrent. Unintentional negative activists lose money immediately upon the 
share price decline. Repeated instances will make it hard for them to raise 
funds from outside investors or to engage in meaningful activism in other 
companies. As with financial actors generally, market forces will punish 
those positive activists with poor reputations, as evidenced by empirical 
evidence linking reputation to investment inflows.240 
If needed, an additional deterrent could come from courts, which could 
empower management to resist unintentional negative activism by 
tolerating defensive actions broadly, particularly when the announcement 
of a long intervention is associated with a negative market reaction. 
Delaware courts’ framework for determining the acceptability of 
management’s response to a perceived threat has been developed in Unocal 
v. Mesa 241  and Unitrin v. American General. 242  This framework often 
requires assessing whether management’s response falls into the range of 
reasonableness relative to the threat posed. 243  Although the range of 
reasonableness is quite expansive, it is even broader when a company faces 
more severe threats to its value.244 
Because unintentional negative activism embodies exactly that type of 
potential fundamental threat, the range of reasonable responses under the 
Unocal and Unitrin frameworks should incorporate an assessment of the 
market’s reaction to the announcement of an activist intervention. An 
activist’s prior track record and stock price reactions could be useful ways 
for courts to identify potential unintentional negative activism, which could 
warrant a greater defensive response. In contrast, courts should view 
defensive efforts more skeptically when the activism is associated with a 
significant positive return upon announcement.  
As a final note, consider the opposite of unintentional negative activism: 
unintentional positive activism. This puzzling form of activism occurs when 
the announcement by a negative activist is associated with a positive 
cumulative abnormal return to the targeted company’s shares. What is the 
appropriate policy response to activist behavior that profits from reduced 
company value but, unintentionally, might instead improve company value? 
Perhaps a negative activist’s intervention is expected to leave the company 
stronger for having countered it; a company’s decisive victory might deter 
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future negative activists, for example, leaving the company more free to 
pursue value.  
Theoretically, this kind of attempted negative activism should be 
encouraged as a policy matter when it ultimately makes the company’s 
shares more valuable. But in practice, we think it will be rare. It would also 
be challenging to identify this type of failed, yet desirable, negative activism 
ex ante and selectively subsidize it while still deterring operational negative 
activism. Accordingly, the current regulatory approach, which does not 
single out this unusual phenomenon, seems appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
We have introduced the concept of negative activism, provided a 
typology of its three main forms, and examined empirically the extent to 
which it occurs. Using this framework, we have assessed the areas in which 
current regulation of negative activism is potentially inadequate. In general 
terms, we favor less regulation of informational negative activism, greater 
regulation of operational negative activism, and perhaps a more nuanced 
approach to unintentional negative activism. Our hope is that our framework 
will prove useful as the field of activist investing continues to evolve. 
We conclude by observing that our analysis of negative activism has 
implications for the ongoing debate about corporate short-termism. On one 
side of the issue, people like Martin Lipton argue that activists contribute to 
a “short-term myopic approach to management and investing that promises 
to impede long-term economic prosperity.”245 For these critics, activism is 
seen as generally sacrificing long-term value for (attempted) short-term 
profits, such as by disrupting long-term investments, reducing activities 
with uncertain distant payoffs, and focusing on quarterly profits rather than 
on long-term growth.246  
Others see activism as offering positive effects for long-term corporate 
performance. Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang, for example, find 
empirical evidence that activist interventions result in immediate positive 
returns which “are followed by long-term improvements, rather than 
declines, in performance.”247 Activists can improve long-term performance 
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by providing an active check on management, reducing the agency costs 
that typically exist between management and shareholders.248 To take two 
common examples, reducing inefficient long-term R&D investments 
improves current value and allows capital to be redeployed to better uses, 
while increasing leverage imposes debt servicing costs to hold 
management’s feet to the fire.249  
The debate about activism’s impact on long-term value is still relatively 
new. But both sides in the debate rely on data about positive activism and 
often disregard negative activism. For example, in their recent study 
supporting activism’s long-term effects, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang consider 
exclusively activism disclosed pursuant to section 13(d) filings,250 but these 
filings capture principally long, or positive, activists, not negative 
activists.251 Critics of activism have relied on the same dataset.252 Other 
important commentators, such as Martin Lipton, also focus primarily on 
positive activism, not negative activism.253 In other words, the debate to date 
largely revolves around studying only one subset of activism.254 
Negative activism adds a new wrinkle to the short-termism debate. 
Consider arguments by critics of positive activism that there is a disconnect 
between short-term market reaction and long-term value, with short-term 
price increases followed by long-term declines. Does this mean short selling 
will be long-term value enhancing to the extent it causes short-term price 
declines? Or consider arguments by proponents of positive activism that 
short-term increases reflect expected increases in future corporate earnings. 
Does it follow that short selling is long-term value destroying? More 
generally, how should scholars interpret the distribution of short-term price 
responses to the announcement of negative activism? How should one 
measure the potential benefits associated with negative activism that 
potentially might outweigh the decline in the value of the targeted 
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company’s shares? In other areas of law, such as free speech jurisprudence, 
instances of individual harm are tolerated in furtherance of a more general 
principle. Might negative activism be yet another example? We look 
forward to a robust debate on these and other issues related to negative 
activism. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
